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Abstract  
In recent years, the oil and gas industry has been facing unprecedented cost and time 
overruns while delivering megaprojects both in Norway and internationally. Combined with 
a dramatic oil price drop, cost overruns became a hot topic in both academic and business 
worlds.  Whilst the project management aspects were in the spotlight, external factors, such 
as government policies, were paid much less attention. 
Although, oil companies are cost minimizers, in a situation of a moral hazard 
presented in the oil and gas industry, certain petroleum fiscal designs can create incentives 
for cost inflation. Thus, the focus of the current master thesis is to understand how different 
fiscal designs affect cost consciousness of the companies on the examples of Norway, UK, 
Indonesia and China.  
According to the comparative study, petroleum fiscal design that incorporates high 
marginal rates on the profits rather than revenues, i.e. more back-end loaded, in combination 
with additional capital allowances and uplifts, tends to create higher incentives for operators 
to inflate their costs. However, such a design is also referred to as neutral and provides 
additional incentives for investments. Therefore, the optimal balance in risk sharing between 
the company and the host government in petroleum fiscal designs is crucial.    
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Introduction 
1.1 Motivation for the thesis topic 
In recent years, the oil and gas industry is facing unprecedented cost and time 
overruns while delivering megaprojects both in Norway and internationally. The failure to 
deliver the projects within predefined time and budget frames could cost energy companies 
trillions of dollars in lost investments. The estimated overspend across the whole capital 
budget of the energy industries could be approximately 13%, which translates to US$5 
trillion overspend on the US$38 trillion IEA forecast for global investments (Accenture 
2012).  
Therefore, over the last three years the researchers tried to identify the factors 
responsible for cost overruns and time delays. Most of the studies are devoted to the internal 
factors related mainly to project management aspects. Not only scholars, but also 
practitioners devote most of their attention to this field. In fact, the author of the current 
thesis took part in a collaborative project with a Norwegian Oil and Gas Department of one 
of the largest international consulting firms. The task assigned by the company was directly 
connected to poor performance of oil and gas field development projects. According to the 
company representatives, consulting services in the area of oil and gas project management 
are high in demand, which reflects the topicality of the chosen problem.  This collaborative 
project was a start of idea development process for the current master thesis topic.  
Whilst the project management aspects were in the spotlight, external factors, such as 
regulatory challenges and government policies, were paid much less attention, despite the 
fact, that petroleum industry is one of the most governmentally controlled sectors, a subject 
to special taxation, subsidies and allowances. Thus, the topic of this thesis is not only highly 
important due to the large scale of cost overruns, but also quite novel due to relatively low 
coverage in the literature.  
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1.2 Research question 
Multiple studies devoted to deliberate cost underestimation in capital projects by 
Bent Flyvbjerg1 in combination with studies devoted to incentives provided by the petroleum 
taxation systems for low cost consciousness by Petter Osmundsen2 were the main source of 
justification and formulation of the final research question:  
 How does different petroleum fiscal systems affect the cost-related behavior of oil 
companies before and after the contract award?  
The answer to the part of the question related to the behavior before the contract 
award implies a rather theoretical approach, which is mainly based on assumptions. The 
answer to the part related to the incentives provided by the taxation policy after the contract 
award can in fact be computed and contrasted for various fiscal regimes.  
1.3  Structure of the thesis  
The structure of the thesis clearly represents the process of the idea development, 
starting from a broad understanding of the problem and then narrowing down to the least 
studied topic. 
The first chapter devoted to the background research is intended to answer the question 
‘why should one study cost overruns in oil and gas industry?’ It provides the evidence and 
significance of cost overruns in the industry.  
‘Literature review’ chapter provides an analysis of relevant studies devoted to various 
factors responsible for cost overruns. Thus, it helps to answer the question: ‘what has 
already been done in this field of research? This answer also implies an analysis of the gap, 
which is intended to fulfil with the current paper.  
The next chapter presents a theoretical overview of petroleum fiscal regimes as well as 
includes a comparative analysis from the research question perspective – cost-related 
incentives. In this chapter a theory of moral hazard is applied to the oil and gas industry, 
which justifies the reasoning behind this thesis.  
                                                
1 Professor at Oxford University 
2 Professor University of Stavanger  
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The rest of the thesis presents an individual research, which includes modelling 
incentives for deliberate cost underestimation, qualitative analysis of the four chosen 
petroleum fiscal regimes, computing incentives for low or high cost consciousness and 
contrasting the results across different regimes.  
 The conclusion summarizes the results of the research, present its implications, as 
well as provides an outlook for the future research potential.  
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2 Background research 
2.1 Megaprojects in oil and gas industry  
Projects across different process industries have become significantly larger and more 
complex over the past ten years. Megaprojects (also used term ‘mega-project’ or ‘mega 
project’) – projects requiring huge physical and financial recourses, typically more than 
US$1 billion (Altshuler & Luberoff, 2003; Flyvberg, 2008). However, the cost of a project 
and its complexity are not the only characteristics that are considered. Moreover, in many 
developing countries projects that cost less than US$1 can still be considered as 
megaprojects as contrasted with the country’s gross national product (Greiman, 2013).  
There are over 25 common megaproject attributes summarised and presented by 
Greiman (2013). A short overview of the main features can be found in Appendix 1. In 
summary, large investment projects take long time to plan and operate, they are relatively 
common in various sectors including oil and gas, transport and infrastructure, chemicals, 
minerals and power and always imply complex technical integration and design. These 
projects usually play a strategic role for society, satisfying its demand for different urban 
developments, energy, chemicals, metals, and other products. Thus, they always attract 
public attention or political interest due to its significant direct and indirect impacts on the 
community, environment and budget. Increased technical and commercial complexity of 
such projects together with its commercial, environmental and political cost and risk made 
the stakeholder scrutiny even stricter.  
Greiman (2013) also names consistent cost underestimation and poor performance one 
of the main attributes. The characteristics mentioned above explain the challenge to make a 
precise cost estimation before the operation starts and cope with the stretching of available 
resources to the limit. The scholars and practitioners made multiple attempts to identify the 
reasons behind significant cost overruns (see Chapter 3), however, cost overruns tend to be 
“a distinguishing characteristic of megaprojects” (Greiman, 2013).  
The underlying reason why megaprojects in oil and gas industry is the main object of 
the current research is the last mentioned characteristic – consistent cost underestimation and 
poor performance, which is thoroughly researched further in the paper.  
The large-scale projects are broadly presented in petroleum sectos. As it was 
mentioned above, projects in this industry are almost always considered as megaprojects 
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regardless of the size. The nature of this industry is unique and requires managing science, 
technology and engineering aspects. The oil and gas extraction projects have always been 
associated with high risks and complexity due to extensive engineering effort. Besides that 
there is no assurance that expenditures will result in commercial quantities of hydrocarbons 
or any quantities at all. 
On top of the traditional risks and complexity, the time of easy extraction and 
procession of natural resources has been coming to an end, and the world is facing an issue 
of progressively more difficult circumstances. The reserves of natural resources are spread 
unevenly across the world, which means that the largest resource-holding countries have a 
power to make an influence on the industry by restricting or delaying the development of 
some easier accessible reservoirs pursuing their own interests (Merrow, 2012). Moreover, 
apart from unexploited conventional reserves, energy companies are looking into emerging 
opportunities in unconventional oil and gas areas, such as shale gas, coal seam gas, light 
tight oil, LNG, oil sands, ultra-deep water and the Arctic. This is the underlying reason for 
increasing size and difficulty of the projects (EY, 2014). The Yamal project in Russia, 
Ichthys LNG plant in Australia, Kashagan project in Kazakhstan are just few examples of 
recent challenging megaprojects.  
2.2 Present and future investment projections in oil and 
gas industry 
The oil and gas industry was always a subject to significant capital spending, which 
more than doubled in real terms since 2000 and amount to about $900 billion (IEA, 2014). 
According to International Energy Agency (2014), the estimated market value of the oil and 
gas produced globally in 2012 was around $4.2 trillion, which is almost double the estimated 
$2.3 trillion generated in 2005. Moreover, the generated value is four times bigger than the 
capital expenditures in oil and gas sector in 2012, which was mainly underpinned by 
consistently higher oil prices and enriched the resource-holding countries.  
The investment projections in oil and gas sector made by IEA in June 2014 suggest 
that the wave of capital spending is going to continue, amounting to $22.4 trillion 
cumulative oil and gas investment between 2014 and 2035, which means that there will be 
more than $1 trillion annual spending globally, with North America, Europe and Asia-
Pacific being the major investment regions (Figure 2.1). It is expected that about 77% of this 
capital spending ($17.4 trillion) will be made in the upstream oil and gas segment. 
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Figure 2.2 Regional cumulative oil and gas investment between 2014 and 
2035. Source: IEA 2014 
However, the investment projections were made by the International Energy Agency, 
NPD and oil companies before the dramatic fall in oil prices as much as 50% that took place 
in the end of 2014. According to the oil minister of Qatar, “the degree of investment cuts is 
substantial due to the oil price of today” (Critchlow, 2015). The low oil price has 
significantly threatened the investments into new field developments globally and especially 
in the regions where the oil exploration activities are the most expensive, such as the North 
Sea in the UK and Norway. The energy companies in the S&P500 have already announced 
$8.3 billion spending cut, whilst a 25% fall is expected in capital spending globally 
(Timiraos, 2015).  
The low oil price, expected investment cuts and, thus, decreased expected number of 
field development projects globally, however, do not understate the importance of the 
present research. On the contrary, cost control is moving to the forefront as profit margins 
decreasing.  
2.3 Performance of oil and gas mega-projects 
As the previous subchapter showed, the investments in upstream oil and gas sector 
increased significantly before the oil price drop. It doubled and, in some cases, tripled the 
annual capital budgets of companies in the last eight years aimed to increase their 
exploration and production (E&P) activities. However throughout this period companies 
failed to enhance their production by the same degree, decreasing their capital efficiency 
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since 2005 (see Figure 2.2) (PwC, 2014).  
 
 
Figure 2.2 Oil and Gas Production and Development Costs (PwC, 2014) 
The lowered capital efficiency is typically explained by four factors (PwC, 2014):  
• more challenging exploration conditions;  
• harder terms of collaboration with resource-owner;  
• increased construction input costs; 
• poor project planning and delivery.  
Decreasing oil prices make the situation even more problematic for investors. While 
the first three factors are mostly out of E&P companies’ control, they do take responsibility 
for the project planning and delivery. However, the oil and gas industry is facing 
unprecedented cost overruns while delivering megaprojects both in Norway and 
internationally.  
Cost overruns are commonly understood as actual costs exceeding estimated costs, 
where actual costs are defined as real construction costs determined at the time of project 
completion, and estimated costs are defined as budgeted or forecasted construction costs at 
the time of decision to build (Flyvbjerg, Buhl, & Holm, 2002).  
The failure to deliver the projects within predefined time and budget frames could cost 
energy companies trillions of dollars in lost investments. The estimated overspend across the 
whole capital budget of the energy industries is approximately 13%, which translates to 
US$5 trillion overspend on the US$38 trillion (Accenture, 2012). Another research of 365 
megaprojects conducted for oil and gas industry (EY, 2014) shows that nearly 64% of the 
projects experienced cost overruns and 73% reported schedule delays globally.  
However, other studies show that this trend is a not a curse of the petroleum sector 
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alone. Poor performance of large capital projects is common in other industries, where 
mega-projects tend to appear, such as infrastructure and urban development, chemicals, 
power and utilities, mining and metals. A global cross-industrial study conducted by 
A.T.Kearney (2012) shows that 63% of capital projects are delivered over budget, and nearly 
70% behind schedule, very similar figures to oil and gas industry. Other studies (Flyvbjerg, 
Buhl, & Holm (2002), Booz Allen Hamilton (2006), Accenture (2012)) also draw an 
attention to this increasing concern globally. 
While capital project performance seems to be similar across the countries and even 
industries, the size of the project itsleft makes a difference in meeting its budget and 
schedule goals. An interesting pattern was discovered by Independent Project Analysis 
(Merrow, 2012): success of the offshore projects declines rapidly with project size. The 
success of the project in this context is defined as meeting its targets stated at the time of the 
financial investment decision (FID). While projects in the range $300-600 million were 
mainly successful, only half of the offshore megaprojects in the range more than $1 billion 
managed to deliver within the budget. Merrow (2012) also mentions that the same rates of 
success and failure is seen across industrial sectors. It draws a conclusion that the larger and 
more complex the project is, the higher chances of exceeding the initial budget are, where 
cost overruns are estimated in billions of dollars.  
Summing up Chapter 2, lowered capital intensity and constant costoverruns is a 
common trend across capital intensive industries. The larger the project is, the more chances 
it has to overrun the intitial budget. The vast majority of projects in oil and gas industry is 
characterized as a megaproject, or a large-capital project, and the recent treck record of oil 
and gas project has shown that companies experience major problems with cost control 
which can be measured in millions of dollars. Finally, taking into account the current market 
conditions, the cost control becomes a main priority when the margins are cut by the oil 
price decrease.  
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3 Literature review  
As it was mentioned in Chapter 2, capital-intensive projects draw a lot of attention of 
the society and increase stakeholder scrutinity. Thus, such constant poor performance of the 
companies in the upstream oil and gas sector and other industries has become an important 
topic in the business and academic worlds. Different factors causing cost overruns are 
discussed further in Part 2 of this chapter.  
According to the definition of cost overruns given in Chapter 2, actual costs are 
compared to estimated costs. While most of the studies focus on why the actual costs keep 
escalating over the time of the project, less researches focus on the first parameter – 
estimated costs. It is important to study cost underestimation as it leads to two problems: (1) 
the project may be started despite the fact that it is not economically viable; (2) the project 
may be started instead of another project that would have yielded higher returns if the actual 
costs and benefits of both projects been know (Flyvbjerg et al., 2009). Hence, Chapter 3 Part 
3 is devoted to cost underestimation.   
The following structure allows to look at the problem from both sides of cost overruns, 
i.e. actual and estimated costs. 
3.1 Cost overruns in large capital projects  
The problem of cost overruns drew attention of various researchers from different 
fields, including engineering, economics and project management, as well as of major 
professional services corporations and governmental institutions, such as Norwegian 
Petroleum Directorate. The analysed articles and studies used different data collection 
methods, including interviews and surveys of managers, obtaining the data from Independent 
Project Analysis (IPA) database and from the project documentation provided by the 
companies or reported to the state institutions. The majority of the examined projects was 
characterised by large scale and international profile. While some researches focused only on 
cost overruns and delays in oil and gas projects (Emhjellen et al., 2003; Jergeas, 2008; Booz 
Allen Hamilton, 2006; EY, 2014; NPD, 2013), others studied overruns and delays using the 
data from other industries, where the capital projects tend to take place, such as 
infrastructure and urban development (Flyvbjerg et al., 2002; Flyvbjerg, 2005; Flyvberg, 
2008; A.T. Kearney, 2012; Merrow, 2012).  
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Table 3.1 Overview of literature sources devoted to cost overruns in capital 
projects 
 
In addition, the studies addressing poor project performance in general (broad focus) as 
well as studies focusing only on initial cost underestimation (narrow focus) are considered. 
The literature with a broad focus presents a set of potential explanations why companies fail 
to deliver projects on time and within the budget. While few studies include inequaquate or 
unrealistic cost estimates as one of the potential explanations of failures to meet the targets, 
the majority of studies focuses on various issues regarding project management such as poor 
front-end loading, inappropriate contract strategy, insufficient project follow-up or human 
resource problems. Table 3.1 presents the analysed studies classified by the focus (broad or 
narrow) and projects (various types or oil and gas exclusively).  This overview emphasizes 
the exisitng gap between studies in various indsutries and oil and gas sector in specific, 
where the latter is lacking studies with both, broad and narrow focuses.  
The findings devoted to the consequate cost escalation and initial cost underestimation 
are presented below. The consequence and volume of the subchapters is explained by a 
higher significance of cost underestimation part, as it has not been widely covered in the 
literature before. While a separate chapter (Chapter 4) includes the studies devoted to fiscal 
policy design implications on project costs.  
Focus of the studies Various categories of projects 
including construction and 
infrastructure projects 
Oil and gas projects 
Broad focus 
(poor performance)  
Hall (1980) 
Morris (1990) 
Chan et al. (2004) 
Arvan & Leite (1990) 
Le-Hoai et al. (2008) 
Kaming et al. (1997) 
Kaliba et al. (2009) 
Assaf & Al-Hejji (2006) 
 
Merrow (2012) 
Jergeas (2008) 
Abdullah et al. (2011) 
Narrow focus 
(cost underestimation) 
 
 
 
 
 
Lovallo & Kahneman (2003) 
Flyvbjerg, Buhl & Holm (2002, 
2004, 2005) 
Flyvbjerg (2005, 2006) 
Flyvbjerg, Garbuio, & Lovallo 
(2009) 
Wachs (1982, 1987, 1989) 
Emhjellen et al. (2003) 
 
 16 
3.2 Explanations of consequent cost escalation 
The table presented above illustrates that the majority of studies were conducted either 
within infrastructure and construction industries or across various capital-intensive 
industries. As oil and gas projects are always capital-intensive, require a substantial 
engineering effort and have a similar project development phases, most of the conclusions 
from the studies are applicable to petroleum sector as well.  
3.2.1 Findings from construction and infrastructure projects  
One of the most common general reasons mentioned by the authors is inefficent or 
ineduaquate planning. According to Morris (1990), 25-30% of cost increase can be explained 
by inflation, while the remaining 70-75% can be attributed to delays inefficiencies, scope 
changes and etc. The author concludes that inedequte project preparation is perhaps the most 
important reason for cost overruns. Kaming et al. (1997) has similar findings, adding poor 
labour productivity and resource shortage to factors responsible for delays and high project 
complexity, inflation and inaccurate material estimating to factors responsible for cost 
overruns.  
Chan et al. (2004) devides factors into two categories – project management  and 
project-participants related factors. The former group includes communication system, 
control mechanism, feedback capabilities, planning effort, organization structure and overall 
managerial actions; the latter – client’s experience and ability, client contribution to the 
project, project team leader’s experience and skills, commitment on time, cost and quality 
and project team leader’s adaptability and working relationship.  
More attention to team management and communication was drawn in later studies. 
For example, Abdullah (2011) concludes, “lack of communication has been noted to be the 
main reason for the failure of many project, hence, effective communication is needed so as 
to reduce non-productive effors, avoid duplication and help eliminate mistakes.  
Exteranal factors, such as different aspects of the environement (ex. bad weather 
conditions) as well as inflation, price and exchange rates fluctuations are also mentioned by 
the authors.  
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3.2.2 Findings from oil and gas projects  
The findings are similar to the previously discussed ones. There are also two main 
groups of factors that can be identified – internal and external factors. External factors are 
commonly presented by regulatory and geopolitical challenges. Internal factors usually refer 
to such project management elements as inadequate planning, poor procurement and contract 
management and human resource capital deficit (EY, 2014). By nature external factors are 
outside of companies’ control area. Therefore, the major studies in the industry are focused 
on project management elements. While there is a wide set of elements affecting the 
performance of the oil and gas upstream projects, the four main categories can be selected 
based on the literature review: front-end loading, contract management and team 
management. A short summary of the three categories is presented below.  
Front-end loading  
Front-End Loading (FEL)  is a project phase aimed to secure a detailed definition of 
the scope needed to satisfy the project’s business objectives for capital investment (Deloitte, 
2014). A well-defined and thoroughly performed FEL phase, leads to less unexpected 
problems and more competitive and predictable project outcomes (Deloitte, 2014), thus, 
more chances to meet the budget and avoid cost overruns. This point of view is supported by 
both, scholars (Jergeas, 2008; Merrow, 2012; Weijde, 2008) and practitioners (NPD, 2013; 
Accenture, 2012; Booz Allen Hamilton, 2006; EY, 2014). 
Contract management 
There are few topics within general contract management, where oil and gas projects 
experience problems, that resulted in cost and time overruns: inadequate prequalification of 
contractors; unclear contract strategy and insufficient follow-ups of suppliers by the operator 
(Schramm, Meißner, & Weidinger, 2010). Insufficient experience of executing complex and 
multidiscipline projects may have detrimental effects on both schedules and costs 
(Stangeland, 2011). Moreover, a poorly constructed contract that does not clearly state the 
scope of work and responsibilities over each step of project realization may lead to disputes 
between the operator and the contractor, leading to time and cost overruns. Last but not least, 
the follow-up of contractors is an important reason for exceeding the time frames and 
budgets (Investeringsutvalget, 1999; NPD, 2013).  
Team management  
The crucial element in team management category is the team composition. While the 
size of team can vary depending on the complexity of the project, the lack of sufficient 
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experience of the team members was an issue mentioned in multiple industrial studies. It is 
important to  that the opinions presented in the literature may vary. For example, Accenture 
(2012) after interviewing 61 executives from different countries concluded that availability 
of leadership talents in general is one of the reasons of project failures. While A.T.Kearney 
(2012) and Booz Allen Hamilton (2009) emphasised the shortage of technical and 
engineering talents in specific. The projects on the Norwegian Continental Shelf often 
experience delays and overruns due to underestimated task complexity and, hence lack of 
allocation of employees with relevant knowledge, according to NPD (2013).  
3.3 Explanations of initial cost underestimation 
There had been written a numerous amount of works devoted to the issue of complex 
projects implementation, i.e. coping with the mentioned-above risk factors and overcoming 
geological, technological and other uncertainties. The literature review revealed that these 
factors do contribute to the cost overruns and time delays. The purpose of the current chapter 
is, however, an attempt to understand why planners and forecasters, on average, fail to 
anticipate the greater costs of complex projects. Therefore, the following chapter is devoted 
to the potential explanations of initial cost underestimation.  
The literature related to this topic is also mainly presented by the researches focusing 
on the infrastracture industry (Flyvbjerg, Buhl, & Holm (2002); Flyvbjerg, Garbuio, & 
Lovallo (2009);  Flyvbjerg, Cantarelli, & Bert van Wee (2010)). In the previous part of the 
chapter the insights from the infrastructure industry could be transferred to oil and gas 
industry easily, as the project design is quite similar. However, the insights relating to cost 
underestimation from the infrastructure industry may not always be applicable in the oil and 
gas sector due to differences in the allocation of funds and production rights, which is taken 
into consideration in the further literature review.  
There are three categories of underlying reasons that are applicable for all forecasting 
errors across the industries: honest mistakes (delusions), strategic manipulation (deceptions) 
or bad luck (Flyvbjerg, Garbuio, & Lovallo, 2009). By bad luck the authors mean “the 
unfortunate resolution of one of the major project uncertainties”, which is a salient 
explanation, but presents little research interest. Honest mistakes or delusions imply that 
planners underestimate costs and overestimate benefits due to delusional optimism, or what 
phychologists call ‘the planning fallacy’. The tendency of executives to consider a project or 
a problem as unique and thus disregard the knowledge from other unsucceful experiences is 
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called an adoptation of the ‘inside view’ in referance class forecasing (Lovallo & Kahneman, 
2003). This way, unrealistic plans are a result of a delusion rather than rational weighting of 
gains and losses. The third group of underlying reasons, strategic manipulation or 
deceptions, refer to what economist call a “Principal-Agent” problem, when actors have 
different preferences and incentives in the system. In this case, planners and executives 
deliberatly underestimate costs and overestimate benefits in order to increase the chances of 
project approval.  
Categories ‘delusion’ and ‘deception’ can further be divided into four groups: 
technical, physocological, political and economical (Flyvbjerg et al., 2003). Where technical 
and physocological refer to ‘delusion’ and political and economical to ‘deception’ (Figure 
3.1).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure Y. Underlying reasons for forecasting errors  
 
Technical explanations  
Technical categoty combines different forecasting errors, including imperfect 
techniques, inadequate, unreliable and outdated data, ‘honest mistakes’, inherent problems in 
predicting the future, lack of experience on the part of forecasters or simply the use of 
inappropriate forecasting models (Flyvbjerg, Buhl, & Holm, 2002; Flyvbjerg, 2006; 
Emhjellen et al., 2003). For example, Emhjellen et al. (2003) explained part of cost overruns 
by the use of 50/50 (median) CAPEX estimate instead of expected CAPEX cost estimate. 
Although, data and methods have been improved over several decades, as well as the 
possibility to predict the risk, based on wider experience from previous projects, the 
Reasons for forecasting errors  
Bad 
luck  
Delusion 
(honest mistakes) 
 
Deception (strategic 
misrepresentation) 
 
Technical  Psychological Political Economic  
Figure 3.1 Underlying reasons for forecasting errors (Flyvbjerg et al. 2002, 
2009) 
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accuracy of cost estimations did not follow the same pattern (Flyvbjerg, Cantarelli, & Bert 
van Wee, 2010). 
Psychological explanations 
Psychological explanations attempt to explain cost underestimation by planning fallacy 
and optimism bias in the mental makeup by project promoters and forecasters. Over-
optimism is a commonly known problem across projects of various scales and industries. 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979), Kahneman and Lovallo (2003), Son and Rojas (2011) argue 
that the high number of business failures is a consequence of executives’ planning fallacy, 
when they make decisions based on delusional optimism, which leads to overestimating 
benefits and underestimating costs. However, Bent Flyvbjerg (2008) suggests that strategic 
misrepresantation could be the chief reason for inaccuracy, i.e. the mistake is delibarate 
rather than ‘honest’ and, therefore, is better explained by economical and political factors.  
3.3.1 Political explanations 
  Both political and economical factors explain deliberate (intentional) underestimation 
of project costs.  The difference between both types of explanation is rather small as they use 
utility as a basis to understand behavior. In both types, costs are intentionally underestimated 
in order to increase the chance of project acceptance. However, economical explanations 
refer to economic rationality, while political explanations construe cost underestimation in 
terms of interest and power (Flyvbjerg, Buhl, & Holm, 2002).  
Supporting political explanations of cost overruns, Wachs (1989) argues that 
planning often refers to the considerations of advocacy, rather than objectivity. As one may 
expect, due to legal, moral and economic reasons, planners and forecasters are unlikely to 
reveal to researchers that the cost estimates were intentionally fabricated. However, while 
interviewing public officials, consultants, and planners who were involved in transportation 
projects in the U.S., Wachs (1990) discovered that the constant cost underestimates are best 
explained by deliberated falsification rather than technical errors. 
3.3.2 Economic explanations 
Flyvbjerg et al. (2002) found a statistical evidence of the systematic underestimation of 
costs in data derived from infrastructure projects. The authors conclude that the costs are 
“highly, systematically, and significantly deceptive” and depict the underestimation as 
delibarate and economically rational. After this conclusion has been studied in more details, 
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Flyvbjerg, Cantarelli, & Bert van Wee (2010) comprise economical explanations group with 
such causes as lack of incentices, lack of resources, inefficient use of resourses, dedicated 
funding process, poor  financing/contract management and strategic behavior.  
Lack of incentives to provide accurate estimates is a common problem in large 
megaprojects across industries, including oil and gas sector. The authors argue that 
forecasters and promoters tend to underestimate the costs in order to make a project to look 
more attractive for decision-makers and, therefore, increase a chance of being awarded a 
licence or selected for financing. Moreover, inaccurate cost estimates can result in a 
situation, where an inferior project is implemented. In this case, the resources are spent 
inefficiently and cannot be recovered. Finally, Flyvbjerg et al. (2010) denotes strategic 
behavior as an economic explanation of its own as underestimating costs increases the 
chance of getting the project started. It seems applicable in the oil and gas industry, as 
international oil companies have to compete for the right to develop a specific oil field, 
where one of the top criteria is the cost-benefit ratio. Therefore, the most basic explanation 
offered by Flyvbjerg et al. (2005): “lying pays off, or at least political or economic agents 
believe it does”, could potentially be related to oil and gas projects.  
As a result, companies, that have lack of incentives to  deliver accurate cost estimates 
and believe that underestimated costs and overestimated benefits increase their chances of 
starting a project, provide an artificially high cost-benefit ratio, which leads to two problems, 
named by Flyvbjerg et al. (2009). First, a project that is not economically viable can be 
approved. Second, a project that yields higher returns can be rejected, i.e. it leads to Pareto-
inefficient allocation of resources. If this is the case in the oil and gas industry, this means 
that the host government does not reach its major policy objective – maximisation of the 
economic rent. 
Economic explanations are mainly based on neoclassical economics and rational 
choice theories, where incentives and costs play an important role in making decisions. The 
neoclassical economics theory is used by Flyvbjerg et al. (2010) to explain the lack of 
incentives for the planners in their role as ‘advocates’, while the rational choice theory 
assumes that individuals calculate the costs and benefits of an action before the decision, 
which means, it is economically rational to underestimate costs because it will increase the 
likelihoood of revenue and profit. For this reason rational choice theory “is considered to 
have considerable potential in explaning cost overruns, not only for economic explanations, 
but also for psychological and political explanations” (Flyvbjerg, Cantarelli, & Bert van 
Wee, 2010). 
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The rational choice theory is also applicable in the oil and gas indsutry for both sides – 
international oil companies and the host governement. While it is clear that the main 
objective of the oil companies is profit maximization, the host governemnts aim at a variaty 
of objectives over time. However, the maximization of the net present value of the economic 
rent is among the most common ones. That means, that the governments are motivated to 
allocate the mineral rights to the most efficient operator, i.e. the lowest-cost bidder, which 
will lead to decreased costs and increased economic rent (Tordo, Johnston, & Johnston, 
2010). 
Concluding the chapter, the literature related to both sides of cost overruns problem 
was analysed. Despite various studies, reports and services aimed at improving the 
performance of the project, the scale of overspendings is increasing. Flyvbjerg et al took a 
different approach. By applying rational choice theory he attempts to explain initial cost 
underestimation as an intentional choice that is expected to bring economic befenits.  
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4 Petroleum fiscal systems and economic 
incentives  
The previous chapter outlined various reasons that could be responsible for cost 
overruns. However, little if any attention was devoted to special petroleum policies from the 
perspective of providing incentives for intentional cost inflation. In order provide some 
explanation to why an economically rational oil company and, thus, a cost minimiser would 
be willing to inflate its costs, the theory of moral hazard is introduced below. 
4.1 Moral hazard and petroleum taxation 
In order to explain why petroleum taxation regimes are the main focus of the current 
master thesis devoted to cost underestimation and overruns, the theory of moral hazard has 
been applied to the oil and gas industry. 
It has long been recognized that a problem of moral hazard may arise when individuals 
engage in risk sharing under conditions such that their privately taken actions affect the 
probability distribution of the outcome (Holmstrom, 1979). In other words, Principal-Agent 
theory is considered in a situation of imperfect information, in which outcomes conditional 
on the agent’s actions are uncertain, and the agent’s behaviour, therefore, unobservable 
(Mirrlees, 1999).  
Principal-Agent theory is often used to demonstrate the design of petroleum taxation 
(Lovas & Osmundsen, 2009). The ownership over the national petroleum reserves is shared 
by all residents of the host government in most of the cases. On behalf of the population, the 
government acts as a ‘principal’ and attracts private companies, i.e. ‘agents’, to participate in 
petroleum extraction. In theory, the government’s main objective is to maximise the net total 
take from the industry and use it for public expenditures and investments, i.e. maximise the 
social benefits. In this case, both, the principal and the agents, aim at reward maximization 
and shifting risks to the other parties. Lovas and Osmundsen (2009) states that, “an ideal tax 
and licensing system captures the petroleum rent, attracts the most efficient companies, and 
induces all socially profitable fields to be exploited in an optimal way”. Moreover, an ideal 
tax system implies optimal risk sharing between the two parties.  
In order to identify if the problem of moral hazard is important in the relationship 
between the government as a ‘principal’ and the company as an ‘agent’, two questions 
should be answered: (1) if there is an existence of hidden actions in the oil and gas industry 
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and (2) whether the outcomes are the joint product of uncertainty and actions known only to 
the agent. 
Regarding the first question, the host government has imperfect means for observing 
the company’s effort to increase output and reduce costs. By company’s effort to increase 
output, exploration and production efforts are assumed. The government gets access to the 
information about the amount of seismic data collected, the number of exploration, appraisal 
and production wells drilled, but the government has imperfect monitor over the amount of 
internal resources allocated to the exploration process. Another observability problem is that 
the government cannot perfectly monitor the efforts to reduce costs. Osmundsen (1999) 
emphasized the development stage, as the investment goods at this stage are not standard 
commodities with established market prices, therefore, the observability over company’s 
efforts to reduce the costs decreases.  
In regards to the second question, the outcome in this case is the output in tons of oil 
equivalent and costs for a given production, where both, the output and costs, are considered 
as stochastic in petroleum industry due to various uncertainties. Hence, in the case of high 
costs and low production, it is often not possible for the government to observe whether it 
could be explained by exogenous factors or simply by a low effort on the part of the firm.  
As a result, moral hazard is presented in petroleum industry due to the existence of 
opportunities for hidden action that impacts the outcome due to imperfect government’s 
control and, most importantly. Having said that, the next two questions aroused: (1) how 
petroleum taxation can actually incentivise cost increase and (2) why would a company, 
traditionally a cost minimiser, intentionally increase its costs.  
A simple answer to the first question is the higher the marginal tax rate, the more 
incentives it provides to write off costs against it. Here it is important to understand that it 
does not actually encourage incurring additional costs, but instead it incentivise allocation of 
costs to the activities attracting high tax. This also explains why a company would 
intentionally increase its costs. In the presence of moral hazard and a high marginal tax rate, 
the international oil company (1) may not report the accurate costs incurred in the project, 
which is an accounting monitoring aspect; (2) may allocate costs of not relevant activities 
with the purpose of writing it off against a high marginal tax rate and get benefits for it 
elsewhere (Osmundsen, 1999).  
In the situation of a neutral tax system, incentives of the company and the government 
are aligned, i.e. makes the operator to expand output and reduce costs. However in the 
situation of higher marginal rates these incentives are eroded and the issue of the company 
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inflating claimed costs is emphasized. Osmundsen (1999) provides an example of cost 
inflating in Norway, which has a high marginal tax for petroleum industry (78%) as well as 
additional cost allowances and investment incentives. The author suggests that Norwegian 
petroleum taxation system makes it attractive to multinational companies to transfer the 
training of personnel to the Norwegian petroleum sector, while the resulting benefits may 
occur in other sectors with lower marginal rates. This way, costs on the Norwegian 
continental shelf can be high as a result of hidden actions.  
To sum up, the objective of this part was to explain with the use of moral hazard 
theory why the taxation is studies in the perspective of cost overruns in oil and gas projects. 
The next step is to study how different petroleum fiscal regimes may differ in providing 
incentives described above, starting with a theoretical introduction to petroleum fiscal 
regimes.  
4.2 Theoretical introduction of petroleum fiscal regimes 
States have sovereign jurisdiction over their natural resources and are responsible for 
maintaining a legal regime for regulating petroleum operations, which is normally set in a 
constitution. While the abundance of hydrocarbons in a state is a gift of nature, it requires 
large investments and efforts to translate it into saleable crude oil. Despite the choice of a 
government to invest directly or through private companies, its primary task is to maximize 
the social benefits derived from the exploitation of this natural resource.  
Petroleum taxation is the principal mechanism for sharing petroleum wealth between 
host governments and investors, or in other words, “it is to acquire for the state in whose 
legal territory the resource in question lie, a fair share of the wealth accruing from their 
extraction, whilst encouraging investors to ensure optimal economic recovery for those 
hydrocarbon resources” (Nakhle, 2008). Thus, the state has two competing rather than 
complementary objectives: (1) to ensure a fair share of revenues for itself (2) to provide 
sufficient incentives to encourage investments. To find a balance between the two objectives 
is the major challenge, especially in a situation of volatile oil prices. In order to overcome 
this challenge, the governments of petroleum-rich nations introduce various taxation 
techniques and relationships with the oil companies, which in combination represent the 
country’s fiscal system design.  
The petroleum fiscal system is a combination of the taxation structure established by 
legislation and the contractual framework under which an oil company operates with the 
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government (Mazeel, 2010). Fiscal terms and conditions can include bonuses, rentals, 
royalties, carried interest provisions, corporate income and special taxes and production 
sharing arrangements. In other words, all kind of payments to the government that are 
required under the petroleum arrangement can be called a “fiscal system” (Khelil, 1995).  
There are two main classes of petroleum fiscal systems as illustrated in Figure 4.1. A 
system is called concessionary when a host government grants a license or a permit to 
explore and produce on a specific field to an oil company. The producing company is 
imposed net tax and/or royalty. A system is called contractual when a host government 
either self-produce or share the production and marketing with private oil companies. The 
private oil companies receive a share of production or revenues in accordance with a 
production sharing agreements (PSA) or a service agreement (SA) (Mazeel, 2010). The 
main difference between a PSA and a SA is the type of compensation an oil company 
receives. In case of a production sharing agreement, the contractor has a right over a share of 
production, i.e. receives its compensation in crude oil. While under a service agreement, the 
contractor gets a share of profits, i.e. receives its compensation in cash. There are more 
subclasses under each of the contractual system. Despite the variation used, the bottom line 
of the fiscal design system is a financial issue, i.e. how costs are recovered and profits 
divided. Both systems, contractual and concessionary, are discussed in more details later in 
the chapter.  
As theory “Principal-Agent” implies, there is no universal optimal contract or tax 
system. An optimal system is rather ‘tailored’ to the specific situation of the contracting 
parties and the transaction. Thus, such transaction-related characteristics, as economic 
attractiveness of the geological area, the oil price, business cycle, presence of infrastructure 
Petroleum Fiscal Systems 
Concessionary Systems Contractual Systems 
Service Agreements (SA) Production Sharing Agreements 
(PSA) 
Figure 4.1 Classification of petroleum fiscal systems (Mazeel, 2010) 
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and competent supplies, in combination with such contracting parties-related 
characteristics, as ability and willing to carry risks and level of impatience for revenue, 
define a state contingent optimal tax policy (Lovas & Osmundsen, 2009).  
In practice, there are more petroleum fiscal systems in the world than there are 
countries, as each country may use more than one system (Johnston, 1994). As there are no 
identical characteristics of the transaction and the contracting parties across different 
countries, there are no identical fiscal system designs. They vary largely from country to 
country. Moreover, the use of more than one fiscal system can be explained by the transition 
period when government uses two different systems at once, or simply by using different 
contract terms applied for different contractors. However, despite such a great variability of 
the fiscal systems around the world, there are basic elements used for design construction.  
4.3 Concessionary petroleum fiscal system 
Many governments decide on engaging private companies with an aim to increase the 
efficiency of the resource exploitation. In this case, one of the most important processes is 
the allocation of the exclusive rights to explore, develop and produce the resources. There 
are various terms such as “permit”, “license”, “concession”, “acreage position”, “contract 
area”, “lease” or “block” that can be used interchangeably most of the times when talking 
about rights for exploration, development and production (E&P).  
Under a concessionary system, the host government grants a license to an international 
oil company (IOC) or a group of companies, which gives a right to explore, develop and 
produce hydrocarbons for a fixed period within a certain lease area (Mazeel, 2010). The host 
government may require the IOC to pay a signature bonus to secure the license. Thereafter, 
the rest of the government’s compensation comes from royalty and tax payments when 
hydrocarbons are produced. As collecting royalties and a combination of taxes is the most 
common way for the government to collect their share of the economic rent within this 
system, it is also called a Royalty/Tax System or R/T.  
Concessionary systems are used by around half of the countries including the US, UK, 
Russia, Norway, France, Argentina, South Africa and Australia (EY, 2014). According to 
Johnston (2003), the percentage of these countries may reach 44% of all oil-producing 
countries. While all these countries have the same type of the fiscal system, the system 
design varies widely in terms of royalty and tax rates, tiers of taxation and other elements 
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such as incentives to promote investments. A short summary of main element of the system 
is present below.  
Royalties have historically been the most common method used by governments to 
gain revenue from oil exploration. Royalties are paid to the government only when the 
production starts, however long before the actual profit generation. Thus, it can be seen as a 
regressive form of taxation. Royalties may distort long-term behaviour and decision-making, 
for example high royalties may lead to early termination of production. The use of 
progressive royalties, i.e. where royalty rates are linked to certain parameters that usually 
closely reflect project profitability, is a possible way to eliminate such risks.  
The Corporate Income Tax (CIT) is levied on oil and gas companies as well as on all 
other companies operating in the country. The tax is paid when annual revenues exceed a 
certain measure of costs and allowences. Therefore, it is important to understand the taxable 
income structure. Many countries provide incentives for exploration and development by 
allowing exploration costs to be recovered immediately and development costs recovery to 
be accelerated, for example over 5 years. Moreover, the governemnt can allow additional 
uplift for capital costs, so the company could in fact deduct more than 100% of costs, in 
order to make the fiscal system more neutral.  In order to secure that the company does not 
deduct exploration and development costs from one project against the income of the other 
project that already generates taxable income, a ring-fencing practices are implemented by 
some countries. However, in a situation where moral hazard is taken into account, hidden 
actions of companies may not be limited by such practicies.  
Additional taxes may be imposed on the petroleum sector. The Brown Tax (BT) and 
Resource Rent Tax (RRT) are the cash-flow taxes. RRT is a modified form of BT and is 
collected only when a rate of return that represent normal profits has been reached. Although 
both, BT and RRT captures a share of the economic rent and make the tax system less 
distortive in theory, it has not been proven to be a significant revenue raiser in practice 
(Sunley, Baunsgaard, & Simard, 2002; Nakhle, 2008).  
To sum up, the two main elements of this system are royalties and corporate income 
tax. In addition, the capital allowences, depreciation and deducutions could be incorporated 
in order to provide investment incentives and encourage expoliration of marginal fields. 
Incorporation of a special petroleum tax increases the marginal tax across various industries, 
including oil and gas E&P rights.  
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4.3.1 Winner’s Curse 
The concessionary petroleum fiscal system implies allocation of E&P rights, which is 
often performed through an auction. Thus, the winner’s curse is a relevant theory that can be 
applied in the oil and gas industry.  
The economic theory behind auctions used by the government is that “the market 
participants are much better informed than the government about the true economic values of 
the goods offered”. However, a crucial element of an auction problem is asymmetries of 
information, when one party has relevant information about the transaction that the other 
party does not have.  In fact, the key element of oil and gas exploration is uncertainty. The 
mineral rights, which the participants are bidding for, have a value, which is worth the 
amount of oil lying under the ground. However, no one knows the true value. The bidders 
have access to different information and different estimates and predictions about how much 
the rights are objectively worth. This is called the common-value model. When the product 
(the resource rights) being bid has a common value, the phenomenon named the winner’s 
curse may arise (McAfee & McMillan, 1987). 
This phenomenon was first presented in the literature by petroleum engineers Capen, 
Clapp and Campbell (1971). The logic of the winner’s curse is simple: “the lease winner 
tends to be the bidder who most overestimates reserves potential” (Capen, Clapp, & 
Campbell, 1971). Given that it is a common value action and the difficulty to estimate the 
true value of the reserves, the estimates of the experts will vary substantially.  It occurs that 
the company that wins the auction will be the one whose experts provided the highest 
estimates, i.e. no one else was willing to bid as much for the item (Thaler, 1988).  
Porter, Wilson, & Hendricks (1994) incorporated the role of information by assuming 
that one bidder has better informtaiton than others. The results of the study has revealed that 
the percentage rate of increase in the distribution of the uninformed bid is always smaller 
than the one of the informed bid and that the informed buyer is more likely to submit low 
bids. This demonstrates that in the auctions the lower costs submitted may be explained by 
simply information assymetry rather than strategic misrepresentation (as suggested in 
Chapter 3.3. Based on this,  certain assumptions are made whilst modeling economic 
incentives in Chapter 7.  
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4.4 Contractual petroleum fiscal system  
The main principle of this system and also the main difference from the concessionary 
system implies the host government’s ownership over the resource, while the oil companies 
have a role of “contractors” who develop and extract in return for a compensation. 
Contractors are required to submit a programme and a budget to be approved by the national 
company of the host government. The contract as a rule depends on the amount of petroleum 
reserves and political and economic aims of the government.  
There are two categories within the contractual system. Different terms are used in the 
literature, such as “production-sharing arrangement”, “production sharing contract (PSC)” or 
“service contract”. In the current paper the terms “Production Sharing Agreement” or “PSA” 
and “Service Agreement” or “SA” are used.  
The main difference between the two systems is the compensation received by an oil 
company: under a PSA system the oil company receives its compensation. In a PSA system 
a host government or a national oil company (NOC) enters a contract with an oil company or 
an international oil company (IOC) directly, which implies that the IOC finances and carries 
out the E&P operations and receives certain amount of produced oil to recover the costs as 
well as a certain share of profit. In some cases, the host government requires additional 
payments apart from the share of production, such as royalties, corporate income taxes, 
windfall profit taxes and other (EY, 2014).  Under a SA system, an oil company receives a 
fee for the service it provides – financing and carrying out projects. The fee usually permits 
the recovery of all or part of costs and a profit component. Moreover, under some service 
agreements, the contractor has the right to purchase crude oil from the host government at a 
discount. Despite the discussed differences, the same economic results under the two types 
are achieved (Mazeel, 2010).  
With an aim to understand better the contractual system, the two main elements are 
described below.  
4.4.1 “Cost oil” 
Even though all the oil extracted belongs to the government under the contractual 
regime, the oil company bears all the costs and risks of exploration and development. In the 
event when discovery of oil does not occur, the company has no right to be paid. However, if 
the discovery does occur, the company is entitled to recover the costs, which is known as 
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“cost recovery” or “cost oil”, which is one of the main elements in the contractual system 
design.  
Typically, a pre-determined share of production is annually allocated for cost recovery. 
According to Nakhle (2008), a general limit for cost recovery ranges from 30-60% of gross 
revenue, which means, for any given period the maximum level of costs recovered is 60% of 
revenue. The limit on cost recovery can be seen as an alternative to royalties in 
concessionary regime, as it ensures that there is “profit oil” and the government obtains its 
share as soon as production starts. Thus, royalties are usually not applied within PSA 
regimes. 
Moreover, as a rule, contractual regimes offer some investment incentives such as 
unrecovered costs carried forward or an uplift factor to compensate for the delay in cost 
recovery. Similar ring-fencing practices as discussed in concessionary system are also 
applied under the PSA regime, which means that costs inccured in a particular block can be 
recovered only from revenues generated within this block.   
4.4.2 “Profit oil”  
After all costs have been recovered, the “profit oil” or “production split” is devided 
between the host government and the company. The split shares are predifined in the 
contract and can be either a sole split or a progressive split. The share of the profit oil that 
the oil company obtains can also be a subject to the income tax. The most typicall share that 
goes to the governemnt is 50-60% of profit oil, however, some countries apply higher shares 
(Johnston D. , 2003).  
The list of countries using contractual regimes includes China, Angola, Algeria, Oman, 
Azerbaijan, Indonesia, Malaysia, Kazakhstan, Iraq, Argentina and others. As it can be 
noticed, contractual basis is presented mainly among developing countries. The potential 
explanation behind it is that contractual system implies a government’s ownership title over 
the resource and facilities (Johnston D. , 2003), a higher government control and, last but not 
least, a larger share of the oil, which can be sold and the revenue used for the government’s 
development programmes and economic needs (Mazeel, 2010). Glomsrød & Lindholt (2004) 
also suggested an alternative idea, “it is not surprising that the PSA contract was selected in 
developing countries such as Indonesia, where production sharing under the name of 
“sharecropping” has been a traditional way of subcontracting in agriculture”.  
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 The two types of contracts are not equally spread across different countries. 
According to Johnston (2003) and International Petroleum Fiscal Systems Data Base, only 
8% of all oil producing countries implemented a SA system, while PSAs are used in 48% of 
the countries. As the economic results are similar under both types of agreements, only 
Production Sharing Agreement, as the most widely used system in the world, is chosen for 
the further analysis and research. Moreover, the majority of studies devoted to evaluation 
and analysis of different fiscal regimes include only one single contract agreement, a PSA, in 
their research (Sunley, Baunsgaard, & Simard, 2002; Lovas & Osmundsen, 2009; Glomsrød 
& Lindholt, 2004; Nakhle, 2008, Johnston, 1994, 2001, 2004). 
Moreover, a PSA regime can have a variety of designs even within one country. The 
scheme can vary from contract to contract. Besides that, it is not uncommon to have hybrid 
revenue schemes containing both, PSA and R/T elements. Examples of countries with hybrid 
systems are Nigeria, Brazil, India, Argentina, Libya and others (EY, 2014).  
4.5 Comaparative analysis of R/T and PSA regimes  
There are different opinions about the similarity of economic results of concessionary 
and contractual regimes. For example, Johnston (2006) states that there is no particular 
fundamental difference between the two systems from a mechanical and financial point of 
view. The main difference is only from a legal point of view, i.e. in the ownership structure 
or, in other words, where, when and if the ownership over hydrocarbons is transferred to the 
oil company. While the concessionary scheme implies the transfer of the title at the 
wellhead, when the IOC gains a right over gross revenue less royalty; the PSA allows the 
transition only at the export point, when the company takes title to ‘cost oil’ and ‘profit oil’. 
However, as it was mentioned, under PSA regime the company still bears all the costs and 
risks of exploration, development and productions, therefore, the title of ownership does not 
affect the economics of the project and, hence, does not provide specific economic 
incentives.  
Johnston (2003) emphasizes the design elements of the fiscal system, rather than the 
type of the system itself, arguing that, “governments can achieve their fiscal objectives with 
any fiscal system they choose as long as the system is designed properly”. Moreover, 
according to Sunley et al. (2002), the fiscal terms of R/T regime can be replicated in a PSA 
regime, and vice versa (Table 4.1).  
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Table 4.1 Replication of R/T elements in a PSA regime (Sunley et al. 2002)  
Reward trade-off/Risk  Concessionary regime  PSA regime  
Low risk to government Royalty Explicit royalty or a limit on 
cost oil that functions as an 
implicit royalty 
Medium risk Income tax Income tax, which may be 
paid out of the government’s 
share of production 
High risk Resource Rent Tax The determination of the 
amount of profit oil can 
imitate the RRT 
 
This means that no conclusion can be made about superiority of one regime over 
another in terms of efficiency or neutrality based only on the type of the system and the 
presence of certain elements in the design. Instead, the specific terms fiscal and the total 
marginal effect should be analysed.  
4.5.1 Analysis from a cost consciousness perspective  
Without taking moral hazard into consideration and, thus, assuming symmetric 
information, optimal risk sharing would mean equal marginal rates for the two parties. By 
optimal risk sharing it is assumed that the company’s incentives are aligned with the 
resource owner’s. However, as it was shown earlier, moral hazard does take place in 
petroleum sector, therefore, the government should provide economic incentives to induce 
effort of the companies.    
Depending on what are the term the governemnt uses within the R/T or PSA system, it 
can provide more or less incentives for cost consciouss behavior of international oil 
companies. High cost conscioussness means that a company has a stricter cost control and is 
more careful about its spendings. Under the R/T system, the higher the marginal tax, the 
higher incetives it provides to write off additional costs. Following the same logic, high 
capital allowences provoke the same behavior if governement’s monitoring effors are 
imperfect, which is the case in petroleum industry. Besides that, if the marginal tax is high, 
which means a high government take, then the company is less motivated to save costs. 
Under the PSA regime, the development and operation cost overruns as well as cost 
savings are shared according the cost recovery terms between the host government and the 
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oil company. Thus, larger government share means lower benefits from cost savings and 
lower income risks in case of cost overruns for the company. 
There is no identical fiscal system in the world. However, there are terms that are more 
typical for one regime or another. World average fiscal terms generalised by Johnston (2003) 
and Tordo (2007) are presented in Table 4.2. Based on generalisation of the terms, a 
common comparison of R/T and  PSA regimes can be made.  
Table 4.2 World Average Fiscal Terms (Johnston, 2003; Tordo, 2007) 
 R/T regime PSA regime 
Number of systems 64 72 
Government Take 59% 70% 
Governement Participation Less likely More likely 
Royalty Rate 8% 5% 
Lifting Entitlement 92% 63% 
Saving Index 56% 39% 
Cost Recovery Index N/A 65% 
 
Typically but not always, the oil company would benefit from cost reductions. The 
degree to which the company would benefit depends on profit-based fiscal terms. The 
Savings Index (SI) (see Chapter 9.1) is used to quantify to a certain extent the incentives 
companies have to keep their costs down (Johnston, 2003).  
The world average terms illustrate that R/T regime typically implies less government 
control and participation, as well as less government take and a higher lifting entitlement by 
the contractor. With such terms, a higher saving index is expected under R/T regime. While 
the PSA system incorporates a higher government take and control, the saving index is 
lower.  
However, there is no such thing as a world average petroleum fiscal system. Each 
country’s case should be considered separately and no generalization or conclusions about its 
fiscal regime’s neutrality or incentives it provides for cost savings based purely on the fiscal 
regime type could be made. Thus, the next step of the thesis is an analysis of real fiscal terms 
of four petroleum-producing countries. 
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5 Hypothesis 
By hypothesis the author of the thesis understands “a supposition or proposed 
explanation made on the basis of limited evidence as a starting point for further 
investigation” as it is simply and clearly defined in the Oxford Dictionaries.  
According to Flyvbjerg (2008) and Flyvbjerg et al. (2002, 2005, 2009, 2010), cost 
overruns in a project can be explained by a strategic misrepresentation of initial cost 
estimates provided by a company to the authorities in order to increases the chances of the 
project approval. This logic can be applied to the realities of oil and gas industry as well as 
the companies have to compete in order to obtain the license. Answering the reseach 
question, therefore, it is assumed that: 
H1. Petroleum fiscal systems provide more incentives for cost underestimation by 
allocating larger shares of profits to the company.  
The second and the major part of the research topic is about the incentives that the 
fiscal regimes provide after the contract is awarded and the project started. The reasoning 
presented by Osmundsen (1999) is that in the presence of moral hazard and a high marginal 
tax rate, the international oil company may be incentivised to report inaccurate costs incurred 
in the project. Therefore, it is assumed that: 
H2. Petroleum fiscal systems that imply higher marginal tax rates provide more 
incentives for low cost consciousness among the oil companies  
It is important to mention that the hypothesis does not intend to generalise all PSAs or 
R/Ts and draw common conclusions based on the research. The research question is 
answered based on the evidence received from the analysis performed further in the paper.  
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6 Methodology  
It was outlined in Chapter 1.2 that the answer to the part of the research question 
related to the behavior before the contract award implies a rather theoretical approach and 
conceptual research, which is mainly based on assumptions. The answer to the part related to 
the incentives provided by the taxation policy after the contract award can in fact be 
computed and contrasted for various fiscal regimes.  
The research design of  the both parts is based on a hypothetical oil project data. Thus, 
the primary step for both researches is: 
0) Defining sample project assumptions 
 The reasons behind using a hypothetical oil project are (1) data availability: it is rare 
when the net cash flow data from a real asset is available outside the firm, as cash flow and 
cost information is proprietary; (2) project specifics: even if data is available for a specific 
field, it include pecularities that are not widely presented among other fields, which may 
partly distort the analysis and (3) the purpose of the study: the conclusions are mainly to be 
made based on comparative analysis, this, relative values rather than actual values are 
important.  Using a standart petroleum project type in evaluating petroleum taxation policies 
is a typical approach among scholars as well as such institusions as World Bank and 
International Monetary Fund. 
6.1 Research related to cost underestimation incentives 
This part is performed as a conceptual research. By ‘conceptual’ the author of the 
thesis understands ‘analytical’ research, that provides an underlying understanding of the 
subject of the reserch. It is recognized that this research type is recommended to used in 
combination with empirical analysis. However, the legal, moral and economic limitations 
associated with data collection about deliberate and true cost estimates, as well as probability 
distribution of chances of award is hard or imporssible to obtain. Thus, only a conceptual 
research could be performed in this secton, which nontheless is intented to provide a better 
understanding of economic benefits for the company and losses for the government.  
The concepual research implies a constraction of a model for economic incentives for 
deliberate cost underestimation based only on assumptions, derived from economics 
37 
theories, such as “Principal-Agent” and others. The model development process follows the 
following steps (given the identified sample project assumptions): 
1) The fiscal regime assumptions are defined 
For this model constraction, specific fiscal terms do not provide additional value, 
therefore, for the sake of avoidance of unnecessary complication, standard 
assumptions of R/T and PSA regimes are made.  
2) Scenario of honest estimates is described 
3) Scenario of deliberate cost underestimation is described 
4) Decision-tree with both scenarios is constructed 
5) Economic incentives for the company are calculated 
6) Opportunity costs for the government are calcualted  
The model and analysis is presented in Chapter 8.  
6.2 Research related to fiscal incentives for cost 
consiousness 
This is the main research of the thesis. The research focuses on only four fiscal regime 
examples (two under each of the system) and, thus, can be considered as a case study 
analysis, which implies the following steps.  
1) Qualitative analysis of the modern fiscal terms of a chosen fiscal regime (Chapter 8) 
Qualitative assessment of the system is important for understanding the true incentives 
the government provides.  
2) Identification of the relevant economic figures and indecies to be computed  
As a full evaluation of a petroleum fiscal regime from cost consioussness point of view 
is relatevly novel, the relevant economic indicators have to be chosen or, in other words, a 
framework for evaluation should be developed.  
3) Computation of cash flows and NPVs for each of the taxation systems for each of 
the sides – the host government and the oil company   
This step requires an understanding of all nuances of the taxation system, as well as 
accounting specifics. The spread sheets of calculations are to be provided in Appendix 11, 
12, 13, 14.  
4) Calculations of the economic figures and indices  
5) Running a One-at-a-time (OAT) sensitivity analysis  
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Three costs categories, CAPEX, OPEX and R&D (in this study – exploration and 
appraisal costs) as an input variable and NPV for the host government and the oil company 
as an output. i.e. values where there is a 50% chance of the actual outcome exceeding the 
base value and a 50% chance of the outcome being below the value.  
7) Comparative analysis of outcomes 
The calculated figures are to be compared and discussed from the government and the 
company perspectives. This analysis is undertaken in order to study in more details the 
difference in the terms within each group of systems. The main insights about fiscal terms 
and difference are to be obtained.  
The thesis proceeds with modelling economic incentives for cost underestimation, 
which is then followed by the main research of the master thesis focusing on fiscal terms and 
their economic incentives. 
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7 Modeling economic incentives for cost 
underestimation 
Two out of four groups of explanations – political and economic – imply deliberate 
cost underestimation. The underlying assumption for both groups is “costs are intentionally 
underestimated in order to increase the chance of project acceptance” (Flyvbjerg, Cantarelli, 
& Bert van Wee, Cost Overruns in Large-scale Transportation Infrastructure Projects: 
Explanationa and Their Theoretical Embeddedness, 2010). The economic group of 
explanations presents the main interest focus of the current master thesis. Therefore, the 
problem of deliberate cost underestimation will be analysed from the perspective of 
economical rationality to underestimate costs.  
The purpose of the current step is to identify if there are any incentives in deliberate 
cost underestimation and what is the impact on the host government if underestimation takes 
place. Based on the rational choice theory, individuals calculate the costs and benefits of an 
action before the decision. In the given context, it means that an increase in the likelihood of 
revenue and profit makes it economically rational to underestmate costs. Based on this 
theory and Flyvbjerg et al. (2002, 2005, 2008, 2010) studies, first thesis statement was 
developed.  
7.1  Project assumptions  
A deterministic approach is used to calculate the level of production, costs and prices, 
which does not imply random variations of the variables. An alternative approach could be 
statistical or stochastic methods to determine possible value distribution. It would have 
provided valuable information for the optimization of the fiscal system. However, the 
objective of the modelling is not fiscal system optimization in a particular country, but a 
demonstration of economic incentives to underestimate costs and an analysis how different 
fiscal terms influence consequent cost consciousness of an oil company.  
In relative terms, different field sizes generate different levels of economic rent. 
Hence, different tax regimes have a varying impact on field profitability given the individual 
specific characteristics of each oil field. According to findings in Merrow (2012), success of 
the offshore projects declines rapidly with project size. Thus, it is interesting to analyse a 
field of a medium or larger size.  
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 In order to avoid unnecessary complications, the modelling is based on a standard 
project, where a single company operates on a single oil field. Besides that, it is assumed that 
a field is guaranteed to have a commercial discovery. An inclusion of determined 
probabilities of exploration (usually 30% discovery and 70% dry hole) and discovery 
outcomes (80% commercial and 20% not) would make a model more realistic, however, it 
would decrease the value of expected NPV but would not provide valuable insights in 
relative terms.  
The sample project is a standard type of an upstream petroleum project that was also 
used by Lovas and Osmundsen (2009) witihin the study devoted to evaluation of petroleum 
taxation. The project has following details: -­‐ Total production of the field equals 400 million barrels, which is the upper limit for a 
“medium” field size according to Sem and Ellerman (1998), Watkins (2000) and 
Ruairidh (2003) and is a “large” field according to Robinson and Morgan (1978) 
classification. -­‐ Exploration phase starts in 2015 followed by apprasal in 2016 and installation the 
production wells in 2019. The production phase lasts for 15 years starting from 2023. -­‐ Production profile represents a typical depletion scenario for a large field. It starts with 
a steep rise followed by a production plateau at 40 millions barrels per year and a slow 
decline spread over nine years. There are no  The profile is presented in Table 8.1.  
Table 7.1 Production profile for a sample field 
 -­‐ Exploration, appraisal and development costs are presented in Table 8.2.  
Table 7.2 Exploration, appraisal and development expenditures of a sample 
project 
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-­‐ The annual operation costs (OPEX) in production phase are equal to $400 mn.  -­‐ The base case oil price is $80. In the shadow of the current price drop, the base case 
price seems optimistic, however, the production of the hypothetical field starts in 2023, 
when, according to The World Bank forecast, the price will exceed $80 in real terms 
(The World Bank, 2015).  -­‐ Discount rate for company and society is 10%, which is a traditional rate for oil and 
gas industry and is applied in the major studies devoted to evaluation of petroleum 
fiscal regimes; 
 
Other assumptions:  -­‐ The oil company applies the full cost (FC) method, where all exploration expenditures 
are allowed to be capitalized.  -­‐ There is no distinction made between intangible and tangible costs, thus, all capital 
costs are treated as tangible.   -­‐ Abandonment procedures and costs are not included. 
7.2 8.2 Fiscal regime assumptions  
These simplified assumptions were made based on the most common terms under each of the 
regimes provided by Johnston (2003). 
Table 7.3 R/T regime assumptions for modelling incentives 
Terms Values 
r 10% 
Oil price 80 
Royalty 12% 
CIT 30% 
βinv 0.166666667 
uplift 10.00% 
 
Table 7.4 PSA regime assumptions for modelling incentives 
Terms Values 
r 10% 
Oil price 80 
Tg(Royalty) 0% 
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Tn 30% 
βinv 0.166666667 
up 10.00% 
βco 40% 
βpo 40% 
The notations are explained in Appendix 2. 
7.3 Modeling incentives and effects of cost 
underestimation  
In the simulated situation a company has two decision alternatives: (1) to deliver 
honest cost estimates; (2) to deliver lower cost estimates. We assume that choice (2) 
increases the probability of receiving the rights to produce in concessionary systems or the 
contract in contractual system.  
7.3.1 Scenario 1. Honest cost estimates  
Under this scenario an oil company submits “honest” cost estimates. “Honest” cost 
estimates means that the forecasters or project promoters did not intend to underestimate the 
costs with the purpose to make the project look more attractive for the decision-makers and, 
therefore, applied relevant data sets and assumptions for the given location and time in 
technical reports, used statistical and mathematical models as well as forecasting techniques 
with a little subject to error. 
The size of the sample project (400 mm barrel) is considered to be large. Thus, the 
competition for the production license on the upstream oil market is also assumed to be high, 
due to the lack of recent big hydrocarbon reserves discoveries. The variance of the 
production costs in the specific location of the different oil companies is assumed to be 
relatively small.  The competing companies do not hold the information about cost estimates 
and bids of each other. Therefore, at the considered moment of time – application for a 
production right – the given oil company, submitting honest estimates, equally evaluates the 
chances of winning (50%) and loosing (50%) in the license or contract award round.  
It is assumed that the host government’s main policy objective from an economic 
perspective is the maximization of the net present value of the economic rent. Under this 
condition, the most cost efficient oil operator is awarded the E&P right. Once the right is 
obtained, the potential subsequent cost overruns are explained by a set of various external 
and/or internal factors (see Part 2). In the simplified model, the awarded company is 
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expected to successfully complete the project with no or minimum deviation from the 
initially claimed cost estimates. 
7.3.2 Scenario 2. Deliberate cost underestimation  
Under this scenario the oil company submits cost estimates that are deliberately 
underestimated with a purpose to increase the chances of being awarded a production license 
or a contract and, therefore, to increase the likelihood of revenues and profit. The company 
intentionally underestimates costs by applying false assumptions in the technical and 
commercial reports; applying irrelevant data – out dated or for a different location; 
falsification of data sets and other.  
The same conditions as in Scenario 1 are applied to Scenario 2, i.e. there is a high 
competition between the companies with similar cost structures on the upstream oil market 
and the government seeks to maximize the value of economic rent obtained from the 
hydrocarbon reserves. This means that a little change in costs provided can increase a chance 
of obtaining a license, i.e. a linear relation between a cost variable and a probability to win 
variable is assumed. Underestimated costs by 10% lead to 15% higher probability of 
obtaining the license. In this case the company would evaluates a chance of license award as 
65% probability.  
Assuming that the oil company knows initially the true estimates of costs that are 
going to occur throughout the project, it uses the true values for the project evaluation. 
Therefore, the expected NPV is the same as under Scenario 1.  
7.3.3 Company’s perspective analysis 
A decision tree is built to depict the scenarios where the value associated with each 
outcome is the net present value of the project. The values located above the uncertainty 
nodes are the expected value of the project taking into consideration different probabilities of 
the events. In order to make the decision tree more realistic, high, medium and low price 
scenarios were added. However, a general simplifying assumption is made that the 
commercial amount of oil would be found once the exploration process starts.  
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Figure 7.1 The value of cost underestimation under R/T regime 
The difference between the expected values of nodes 1 and 2 is the value of the 
deliberate cost underestimation for the company. Under the concessionary regime, the value 
is $330 million. The same calculations were made for the PSA regime (see Appendix 6), 
where the value of ‘lying’ amounts to $36 million. The linear relation between the 
probability of contract award and the value of cost falsification is illustrated at Figure I 
below.  
Table 7.5 Probability of contract award and value of cost underestimation 
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companies, that act as economically rational players and have a positive NPV (calculated 
with consideration of the true expected costs) for the awarded project, would constantly be 
encouraged to underestimate their costs. The fact that subsequent cost escalation can be 
explained by a various set of factors makes it easier for the oil companies to disguise the 
initial intentional underestimation.  
7.3.4 Analysis from the government’s perspective 
While the logic behind the oil company’s behaviour is clear, it is more interesting to 
look at the situation from the host government’s perspective. Under Scenario 2 (Deliberate 
cost underestimation) it is important to understand that a government in fact does not choose 
the actual most cost efficient operator. Assuming that there is a company that can be more 
cost efficient in developing the field, the government incurs opportunity costs by not 
awarding this operator. The opportunity cost in this case is the difference between the 
government’s potential NPV when the actual cost leader is awarded and the government’s 
real NPV when the company with false cost estimates is awarded.  
As it was originally assumed, the oil company decreases its cost estimates by 10% in 
order to increase the chance of contract approval. The government’s expected net present 
value is then calculated taking into consideration the decreased operating costs that equal to 
$360 mm annually. The potential government’s expected value is also calculated when the 
truly cost efficient operator wins the license/contract with annual operation costs equal to 
$380 mm (which is lower than the real costs of the winning operator - $400 mm and higher 
than the claimed costs of the same operator - $360 mm). The expected value for the 
government is calculated based on the annual government’s share of all economic profits or 
‘government take’, which was discounted in order to consider the timeframe for payments as 
well as weighted in order to consider the three price scenarios.  The annual ‘government 
take’ under Concessionary regime equals to the sum of royalties and a CI tax, and under 
PSA regime - government’s share of ‘profit oil’ and a CI tax. 
Table 7.6 Government's opportunity costs 
Opex, mm $ Expected Government take under 
Concessionary 
Expected Government take 
under PSA 
$380.00  $2,248.39   $3,993.73  
$400.00  $2,231.72   $3,971.97  
Opportunity costs, 
mm$ 
 $16.67   $21.76  
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The results show that the government could have potentially gained $17 million and 
$22 million more under a concessionary and a production sharing agreement respectively, if 
the truly most cost efficient operator was chosen. As the PSA regime implies a larger 
government take, it is expected the opportunity cost to be larger than under concessionary 
regime, which is true for the sample project calculated above.  
Table 7.7 Sensitivity analysis of expected government's share 
Opex, mm 
$ 
300 320 340 360 380 400 
% 75% 80% 85% 90% 95% 100% 
EV Gov. 
PSA 
$4,098.96 $4,071.72 $4,044.91 $4,019.08 $3,993.73 $3,971.97 
% 96.9% 97.6% 98.2% 98.8% 99.5% 100.0% 
 
Calculation of the expected value of the government’s share under the PSA regimes for 
different cost scenarios shows that every 5% operation costs increase decreases the 
government’s share by approximately 1%. Similar results were obtained for Concessionary 
regime and could be found in Appendix 7. 
7.4 Discussion  
As one of the purposes of the modelling was to demonstrate if there are any incentives 
for the company to provide deliberate cost underestimates and how it differs under the two 
most common regimes, the following conclusion can be made.  
Under a condition that the government pursues a goal of economic rent maximization 
and does not impose any cost on delivering false estimation, there is an economic incentive 
for an oil company to deliberately underestimate the costs, which was demonstrated by using 
a decision-tree. While it is hard to compute how much the chance of getting a contract 
increases in the case of cost underestimation in a real business setting, certain assumptions 
were made to demonstrate the calculations of the economic value of underestimation.  
As the concessionary regime yields higher profits, the value of cost underestimation 
increases. Thus, the hypothesis made in the beginning reflects the core of the model: 
“Petroleum fiscal systems provide more incentives for cost underestimation by allocating 
larger shares of profits to the company”. 
Secondly, the government’s opportunity costs were also explained and demonstrated. 
While the government’s takes differ largely across the regimes, the opportunity costs were 
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increasing by approximately the same relative value under both Concessionary and PSA 
systems, when only change in operation costs was considered. Finally, the benefits for the 
company who underestimates costs are significantly larger than the opportunity costs for the 
government that chose a less cost efficient operator.  
The hypothesis (H1) that was made prior the research is right.  
Petroleum fiscal systems provide more incentives for cost underestimation by 
allocating larger shares of profits to the company.  
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8 Qualitative analysis of international petroleum 
fiscal regimes  
Fiscal regimes were chosen for a detailed analysis in the following countries: Norway, 
UK, Indonesia and China. Fiscal policies of these countries are often a subject of evaluation 
in research papers. However, only Norwegian system has been analysed from the perspective 
of incentives it creates for cost inflation. All of the countries are important oil producers in 
the world. Norway and UK represent concessionary fiscal regime. Both of the countries 
extract oil from the North Sea, where the capital costs are infamously high. Moreover, both 
of the countries experience major problems with poor project performance. China and 
Indonesia represent production sharing agreement regime. However, China incorporates  
more progressive tools of taxation, which makes it more interesting for comparison.  
8.1 Norwegian concessionary regime 
In 2012, Norway was 14th largest oil producer and 5th largest natural gas producer in 
the world. Based on its daily petroleum production in 2014, Norway is 15th largest producer 
in the world (IEA, 2015). It is also a significant oil exporter due to small internal oil 
consumption. Hydrocarbons are extracted on the Norwegian continental shelf in the North 
Sea, where the costs of exploration and production are traditionally high. Norwegian 
petroleum taxation system belongs to the concessionary group and is an example of a simple 
but yet close to neutral fiscal regime (Lund, 2014). The state receives its revenues partly 
through direct participation and partly through taxation of the participants in the industry.  
In order to explore and produce oil, a license should be obtained from the Ministry of 
Petroleum and Energy. Although governmental standards are set high, projects on the 
Norwegian Continental Shelf experienced major quality and cost overruns (Table 5.1).  
Table 8.1 Cost overruns on various field development projects approved 
between 2007-2012 (NPD, 2013)  
Project PDO appr. PDO est. New est. Change Change % 
Brynhild 2011 4277 4579 352 8% 
Goliat 2009 30942 37142 6200 20% 
Hyme 2011 4593 4780 187 4% 
Jette 2012 2590 2909 319 12% 
Knarr 211 11437 11527 90 1% 
Marulk 2010 4162 4476 314 8% 
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Oselvar 2009 4937 5120 183 4% 
Skarv 2007 35632 47162 11530 32% 
Skuld 2012 9895 10147 253 3% 
Valemon 2011 26329 26880 551 2% 
Valhall 2007 25163 46727 21564 86% 
Vigdis 2011 4194 4467 273 7% 
Yme 2007 4894 14114 9220 188% 
Asgard 2012 15660 17693 2031 13% 
Relative neutrality, high government participation and poor performance of oil 
companies makes Norwegian petroleum fiscal regime an interesting case to consider.  
8.1.1 Norwegian petroleum fiscal regime details 
The Norwegian petroleum fiscal regime is mainly based on corporate income tax (CIT) 
and special petroleum tax (SPT).  
Table 8.2 Norwegian petroleum fiscal terms at a glance (EY, 2014) 
Terms Values 
Bonuses None 
Royalties None 
Income tax rate 27% 
Resource rent tax (or SPT) 51% 
Capital allowances Yes: depreciation over 6 years and an 
additional uplift 22% 
Investment incentives Loss carry forward with interest  
 
The royalty was abolished in 1986 (Nakhle, 2008). An ordinary CIT with a rate equal 
to 27% is applied. Due to the extraordinary profitability, SPT was introduced, which current 
rate is 51% (Deloitte, 2015). This amounts to a marginal tax rate of 78%. Capital 
expenditures are a subject to depreciation on a linear basis over six years. The company can 
write off all relevant expenditures for exploration, appraisal, net finance, operation, 
decommissioning and etc.  This is applicable for taxable income calculation for both CIT 
and SPT taxes. A special deduction, uplift, is allowed in taxable income calculation for SPT. 
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Currently total amount of 22% of investment can be deducted over 4 years (5.5% annual 
deduction). This means 89.2%3 of offshore investments are eventually deductible. If a 
company does not have a taxable income, it has an option to carry forward losses with 
interest; hence no tax is paid until all losses have been absorbed. Moreover, oil companies 
can receive a refund of the fiscal value for exploration costs (78%) in their tax return from 
the Norwegian state annually. There are no expected significant changes in the tax system in 
the near future.  
8.1.2 Analysis from a company’s cost consciousness perspective  
The system is considered to be close to neutral, i.e. it does not distort investment 
decisions and induces companies to maximize their pre-tax values, but it is costly and risky 
for the government (Lund, 2014).  
The distinctive feature of Norwegian petroleum tax regime - high marginal tax rate 
(78%), according to Osmundsen (1999), may provoke low consciousness among 
international oil companies, due to (1) high benefits of deducting additional costs and (2) 
low fraction of cost savings received by the operator.  
Moreover, neutrality of a tax system usually implies higher risks for government. Risk 
sharing has been moved to the government through: (1) abolishing of low marginal tax rate 
and the regulation that required foreign companies to carry Statoil’s exploration costs (2) a 
shift of the tax level closer to economic conditions also implies additional risk transfer to the 
government and (3) high direct government participation through the national oil company. 
The behaviour of oil companies on the Norwegian continental shelf is often described as risk 
seeking (Osmundsen, 1999) and is explained by high direct state participation.  
In response to such behaviour the government imposed incentives to induce the 
optimal level of unobservable effort by increasing the equity share of the operator. This 
feature provides incentives to refund the true costs in the internal accounting and makes the 
fiscal system close to neutral. However, the petroleum fiscal terms still bear too little risk on 
the companies. Low saving index makes it clear that this system may cause low cost 
consciousness and excessive testing of new technology. 
                                                
3 51% + 27% + 22%*51% 
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8.2 United Kingdom concessionary regime 
United Kingdom used to be a major non-OPEC oil and gas producer. The production 
rate was in decline since 1999 with 5-10% rate. However, in 2011 UK the decline 
accelerated and reached an unprecedented decline rate 17.9%, which was partly explained by 
an increase in North Sea taxation, which added fiscal uncertainty. UK is ranked 50th by its 
daily production in the list of global oil producing countries (EIA, 2015). On the contrary, 
capital, exploration, appraisal costs for the UK continental shelf in the North Sea had 
significantly increased over the last decade. Starting in 2004, total OPEX for oil and gas 
nearly doubled by 2012, whilst the production had more than halved (Mearns, 2013).  
The current situation alone makes UK continental shelf an interesting subject for 
analysis. The Norwegian regime has often been compared with the UK petroleum fiscal 
regime (Nakhle, 2008). Therefore, the two countries present an interesting case for 
comparison.  
8.2.1 UK petroleum fiscal regime details  
The UK fiscal regime is a concessionary regime with a combination of corporate 
income tax and supplementary charge rate (32%). Petroleum resource revenue tax (50%) is 
also applied for fields that received the development permission before March 1993. The 
royalty was abolished on all fields in 2002 (Nakhle, 2008)  
Table 8.3 UK petroleum fiscal terms at a glance (EY, 2014) 
Terms Values 
Bonuses None 
Royalties None 
Income tax rate 30% ring-fence (20% non-ring fence)4 
Supplementary charge rate 32% 
Petroleum resource rent tax 50% for fields received development before 
April 1993 
                                                
4 Starting since April 1st 2015 (EY, 2014)  
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Capital allowances Immediate write-off for exploration costs 
Investment incentives Loss carry forward, R&D incentive 
The corporate income tax differs based on ring-fencing. Profits from oil and gas 
exploration and production are subject to the ring-fence rate. CIT was initially set at 52% but 
was reduced to 30%. Supplementary charge is an additional tax on profits from oil 
production.  Taxable income is calculated in the same manner as for CIT but without any 
deduction for finance costs. This means that a total marginal tax rate for fields approved 
before 1993 – 81% (as PRT is deductible for IT and supplementary charge) and after 1993 - 
62%.  
The system incorporates investment incentives for certain high-pressure high-
temperature, ultra-heavy-oil, deep-water gas fields and other, as a rule, marginal fields. It 
involves a special field allowance (reduces a company’s ring-fenced profits for 
supplementary charge), oil allowance (certain amount of production is allowed to be earned 
free of PRT), and safeguard (allows to earn a specific return before being subject to PRT). 
For other fields an additional uplift 35 % for capital expenditures is available to reduce PRT 
taxable income.  
Exploration and appraisal expenditures are a subject for 100% R&D allowances. 
Additional allowance are available for R&D costs not related to exploration and appraisal at 
a rate of 130% for large companies and 200% for small and medium-sized companies.  
The loss can be carried forward and be offset against any chargeable gains. A 100% first-
year allowance (FYA) is available for most capital expenditures incurred.  
8.2.2 Analysis from a company’s cost consciousness perspective  
There is a significant difference in fiscal terms that are applied to oilfields that were 
approved before and after 1993. While profit from the recent fields is a subject to CIT and 
SC, an additional petroleum tax is applied to more mature fields. Firstly, it means a larger 
government take. Secondly, UK government offers generous tax reliefs in order to prevent 
petroleum revenue tax from being an undue burden on marginal fields. Thirdly, it makes a 
taxation system quite complicated. In an industry where moral hazard is presented and the 
government as an ‘agent’ does not have perfect control over company’s effort, all of the 
three characteristics reduce the company’s incentives to cut costs.  
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Abolishing of PRT for the new fields clearly reduces the marginal tax rate and hence, 
government take and overall simplifies the petroleum taxation. Reduced total marginal rate 
from 81% to 62%, given the maturity of oil province, is necessary to sustain oil production. 
Moreover, an immediate depreciation of the costs increases the faction of every cost saved if 
the time value is considered. Overall, the government has undertaken certain actions in order 
to induce companies’ effort in terms of costs and production.  
8.3 Indonesian production sharing agreement 
Indonesia is one of the most active countries in South-East Asia for nearly 130 years 
after the first oil discovery in North Sumatra and continues to be a significant player in the 
global oil and gas sector (PwC, 2012). Indonesia is ranked 22nd among world oil producers 
by its daily production in 2014 (EIA, 2015). Indonesia is also a pioneer of the production 
sharing agreements, as the first contract was signed in the early 1960s (Nakhle, 2008).  
The issue that the industry is facing is declining oil production over the last decade. 
The decline is explained by mainly a lack of exploration and other investments due to weak 
government management, bureaucracy, an unclear regulatory framework and legal 
uncertainty regarding contracts. The petroleum fiscal regime is often referred as one of the 
most punitive in the world. 
8.3.1 Indonesia’s petroleum fiscal regime details 
The petroleum fiscal regime consists of production sharing agreements that are 
contracted between oil companies and the executive body for oil and gas upstream activities 
on behalf of the Indonesian government.  
Table 8.4 Indonesian petroleum fiscal regime at a glance (EY,2014) 
Terms Values 
Bonuses Depends on PSA terms 
Royalties None 
Corporate income tax  25% 
Branch profits tax (BPT) 20% 
Government profit oil share 64% 
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Cost recovery limit No limit stipulated in the contract, but actual 
80%5 
Capital allowances Declining-balance depreciation 
Investment incentives Loss carry forward  
 
The income tax rates for CIT and BPT depend on the year the contract was entered. 
Ring-fencing rule is applied, restricting companies to offset working interest in one area 
against income of another area. The CIT has been reduced to 25% for 2010 onwards 
(Deloitte, 2013). 
Indonesian PSA system does not charge a royalty, but instead includes fiscal term ‘first 
tranche production’ (FTP) or ‘branch profits tax’ (BPT). First tranche production is imposed 
on gross revenue and is equal to 20%, which means that 20% of gross revenues is split 
between the government (64%) and the contractor (36%). Government’s FTP is a part of 
total government take, while contractor’s FTP is a part of its taxable income.  
The next term is ‘domestic market obligation’ (DMO). After 60 months of production 
it requires the contractor to sell 25% of oil to the domestic market, i.e. to the national oil 
company Pertamina. The price set as 25% of the market price.  
There is no limit for cost recovery, however, 20% FTP act as a cap by reducing the 
available gross revenue for recovery. Hence, in fact, 80% of gross revenue is the actual cost 
recovery limit.  
Contractors are allowed to carry forward their losses. Contractor are also permitted an 
investment credit 15.5% after tax. Annual depreciation on capital expenditures is 25% using 
the declining balance method with undepreciated amount written off in year five.  
8.3.2 Analysis from a company’s cost consciousness perspective  
Indonesia’s PSA was famous for its split 85/15, where a national oil company 
Pertamina would receive 85% and a contractor 15%. However, the policy has been changed 
towards allocation of more share of profits to contractors. Currently, the general split of 
profit oil and FTPs between the government and the contractor is 64/36 respectively. That 
means that the company gets 36 cents more on every dollar saved in costs before tax and 27 
                                                
5 There is no recovery limit stipulated in the PSA, however, BPT limits the gross revenues for cost recovery by 20% 
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cents after the tax. Even though this figure is much higher now, in combination with no limit 
for cost recovery, it may be still seen as a potential incentive for companies to inflate costs.  
Declining balance method for depreciation allows receiving a higher post-tax cash 
flows in the beginning, thus, increasing the net present value for a contractor. However, this 
increase is insignificant and does not provide noticeably different incentives.  
8.4 Chinese PSA regime  
China is 4th largest oil producing company in the world with daily production of 4.5 
million barrels per day in 2014 (EIA, 2015). China used to be a net oil exporter, however it 
changed in 1993. China, being a second largest energy consumer and forth largest oil 
producer, is one of the major players in world oil markets.  
China adopts a production sharing agreement system combining it with a corporate 
income tax and royalties. Moreover, the sliding scales applied in sharecropping of profit oil 
make it an interesting regime to study. 
8.4.1 Chinese petroleum fiscal regime details 
The Chinese fiscal regime consists of PSAs, special oil gain levies, VAT, resource tax 
and CIT.  
Table 8.5 Chinese petroleum fiscal regims at a glance (EY,2014) 
Terms Values 
Bonuses Depends on PSA terms 
Royalties None6 
Income tax rate 25% 
Resource tax 5% 
Special oil gain levy Depending on oil price 
VAT 
Cost recovery limit 
17% 
62.5% 
                                                
6 For projects approved after November 1st 2011 (EY, 2014) 
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Capital allowances 100% straight line depreciation of capital 
expenditures  
Investment incentives R&D costs deduction at 150%   
 
Royalties are only applied to projects approved before 1 November 2011. The rate has 
a sliding scale depending on the daily oil production, with a maximum rate being 12.5%. The 
new projects are exempted from this payment.  However, an additional resource rent tax 5% 
was introduced in 2011. Besides that, a special oil gain levy is used, which is petroleum 
special profit tax levied on all oil companies selling crude oil in China. The revenue windfall 
is charged when the weighted-average price of crude oil sold in any month exceeds $55 per 
barrel. A sliding scale is also used where a price increase leads to a higher tax.   
Profit oil is also split on a sliding rate, depending on the annual level of production.  
Cost oil or cost recovery limit varies from offshore and onshore projects from 50% to 62.5% 
respectively. All exploration, development and operating expenses are to be covered. After 
profit oil has been split, the contractors are taxed corporate income tax at 25%. Special 
allowances include 5 years loss carry forward, 150% deduction of qualified R&D. It is 
allowed to carry forward the loss for 5 years. 
8.4.2 Analysis from a company’s cost consciousness perspective 
China has abolished royalties, however, it still has a large share of front-end loaded 
taxation instruments, such as VAT, newly introduced recourse rent tax at 5%, which is going 
to be raised after 2015 by 1%. This emphasises that most probably less government share of 
profit oil can be expected, and, hence, a higher incentives for cost control are to be provided 
for oil companies, as they can receive a larger fraction of benefits form saved costs.  
The main different from Indonesia is that China incorporates progressive forms of 
taxation. The preliminary conclusion can be made that the sliding scale in profit oil share 
adds flexibility to the contract, but could also provide additional disincentives in cost 
efficiency. The Chinese regime, however, by applying a sliding scale based on the 
production, rather than profit, eliminates the potential disincentives. Loss carry forward and 
additional R&D cost deduction transfers a certain share of risk to the government.  
The analysis in Chapter 9 is intended will include calculation of what the government 
take and other indices are, and then certain conclusions about incentives.  
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9. Comparative analysis of incentives under 
international petroleum fiscal systems 
9.1 Framework for evaluating fiscal incentives  
When the project and fiscal regime assumptions are made and all cash flows are 
calculated, the petroleum fiscal regimes are to be evaluated on the subject of cost-related 
incentives. There is no specific framework available for such evaluation. However, different 
studies were evaluating fiscal regimes from a general economic perspective. Few of the 
criteria used in these studies are presented in Table 9.1.  
Table 0.1 Economic evaluation parameters of petroleum fiscal regimes 
 
Some of these criteria are relevant for making conclusions about cost-related 
incentives it provides. According to Osmundsen (1999), such figures as marginal rates, 
government take, equity shares and fractions received by the contractor from every saved 
monetary unit, may identify if the tax regime promote low cost conscious behaviour of the 
oil company. Based on the author’s reasoning, the following evaluation figures and indices 
were chosen.  
Government take and government NPV   
The division of profits between companies and government is often referred to as 
“take”. Thus, government take is defined as “the government’s percentage of pre-tax project 
Study Evaluation figures 
The World Bank (Tordo, 2007) NPV, IRR, PR, Operating Leverage, 
Government Take, Saving Index 
The International Monetary Fund (IMF,  
2012) 
NPV, IRR, Effective Marginal Rate, 
Coefficient of variation, Profitability Index 
David Johnston (2003) Government take 
Effective Royalty Rate 
Government Participation  
Saving Index 
 Progressive – Regressive Systems   
Exposure to Exploration Risk 
Daniel Johnston (2003) Effective Royalty Rate 
Saving Index 
Entitlement Index 
Cost recovery limits  
Progressive – Regressive System  
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net cash flow adjusted to take into account any form of government participation” (Tordo, 
2007). In other words, government take include all of the means by which government 
economically benefits from the project (bonuses, royalties, taxes, profit oil and etc.). The 
government take can also be calculated in discounted or undiscounted values.  
In order to incorporate the value of time, the annual government take, i.e. 
government’s net cash flow, is discounted and summed up. The method of Discounted Cash 
Flow (DCF) is the most common form of project evaluation in the oil and gas industry 
(Nakhle, 2008). The majority of economic studies uses this traditional technique to evaluate 
the profitability of an oil field. Moreover, it was found that 99 per cent of oil and gas 
companies utilize this method (Siew, 2001). Net Present Value (NPV) is an analysis tool that 
measures the economic profit of an investment.  
IOC take is a complement parameter to government take. NPV of IOC is the decision-
making criteria used to evaluate a project by contractors.  
Effective royalty rate (ERR)  
As a single measure, government take fails to provide information about the timing of 
payments (Johnston, 2003). The ERR is a statistic that shows how quickly a government 
takes its share. This index is a common metric used in the industry and it calculated as share 
of revenue that the host government expects to receive from royalties and profit oil (Tordo, 
2007). If the system does not have a recovery limit, then the royalty rate is the ERR. If 
royalties are absent as well, then ERR equals to zero. In a situation of large capital-intensive 
projects, the government may experience cash flow problems, as the taxable income may 
stay negative for a long time due to long cost recovery, which means zero government take. 
The lower ERR is, the more back-end loaded the system is and the more patient the 
government is. This is expected to be more common among developed countries.  
The drawback of ERR is excluding the effects of depreciation or amortization due to 
its focus on gross revenues. It also excludes the effects of government participation.  
The Saving Index (SI) 
SI is defined by the World Bank as, “the part of an additional one dollar in profit 
(arising from a one-dollar saving in cost) that accrues to the contractor” (Tordo, 2007) or, in 
other words, it measures how much a company gets to keep if it saves one dollar. It is 
important to note that only the profit-based fiscal elements influence this index. 
The index can be explained by the following example. Let us consider an R/T system 
with a 60% Special Petroleum Tax and a 30% Income Tax. When the company saves one 
dollar in costs and therefore adds it to the taxable income, the government first takes 60% of 
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that, leaving the company with 40 cent, and then another 30% of these 40 cent, so the 
company only get’s to keep 28 cent on the dollar saved. The SI is 28%. Under a PSA regime, 
the saving index corresponds to the company’s share of profit oil (Johnston, 2003).  
8.5 Comparative analysis of four fiscal regimes 
8.5.1 Comparative analysis of the evaluation parameters 
The calculations of the net cash flows can be found in Appendix 11, 12, 13 and 14. 
Fiscal regime assumptions are also presented in Appendix 10. Fiscal terms that are relevant 
only for the new fields for the sample field were applied, i.e. the modern design of the 
systems was evaluated.  
Table 0.2 Comparative analysis of chosen parameters of the chosen fiscal 
regimes 
 Norway UK Indonesia China 
NPV Gov  $3,184.22   $2,755.28   $3,333.13   $3,671.77  
NPV IOC  $182.12   $611.06   $33.20   $-305.43  
Government 
take 
73% 62% 73% 72% 
IOC take 27% 38% 27% 28% 
IRR IOC  11% 13% 10% 9% 
Cost recovery N/A N/A 80% 62.5% 
Cost deduction 89% 62% N/A N/A 
ERR 0% 0% 34% 23% 
Saving Index 22% 38% 27% 65% 
 
First of all, the main economic indicators used for decision-making processes and 
ranking of the project, i.e. NPV and IRR makes the sample project more attractive for 
investors under the UK regime and the least attractive under the Chinese PSA regime. 
Overall, the project has higher profitability under the two concessionary regimes.  
Norwegian petroleum fiscal has the lowest Saving Index. Its design incorporates high 
marginal rates 78% on the profits in combination with additional cost uplifts, which allows 
89% of the costs to be deducted. On the contrary, China has the highest SI. Its design 
incorporates high rate based on the gross profits and low participation in the profit oil 
sharing, which allows the contractors to obtain more of the benefits from cost saving.  
Government take figure is almost the same in Norway, Indonesia and China. At the 
same time, the saving index varies across all presented regimes. Therefore, this figure does 
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not necessarily determine incentives for any specific cost-related behaviour. For example, 
Norway has 73% of government participation, the project profitability is much higher, whilst 
saving index is the lowest. The explanation can be found in looking at ERR rate, which 
means how front- or back-end loaded the regime is, i.e. how fast the government obtains its 
profits. In both PSA regimes, the front-end load is quite significant. China imposes a 
marginal tax of 22% on gross revenues though collecting VAT and a new Resource Rent 
Tax. Indonesia uses FTP and DMO as front-ending loading elements to secure earlier 
revenue collection.  
From the company’s cost consciousness perspective, the ERR would not effect the 
behaviour following the logic of the saving index, when only an additional dollar saved on 
costs and added to the profit considered. However, by looking from the perspective of total 
tax allocation, high ERR would often mean lower income tax rate or government share of 
profit oil. In the situation where the tax is only based on gross revenues, i.e. the ERR is 
expected to be relatively high, the fraction of costs saved is 100%, which leads, on the one 
hand, to a distortive and non-neutral taxation system, but on the other, to a maximum induce 
of company’s efforts to save costs. 
This, in fact, can be observed in China, where the government share of profit oil is 
calculated at a sliding scale and the average government share of profit oil is 4.5%, which is 
considered to be extremely low. Despite the fact that the contractor’s income is then taxed at 
33% CIT, the SI is the highest – 65%. However, the distortion of this system is quite clear, 
as it is the only regime that made the sample project, which is profitable before tax and after 
tax under UK, Norwegian and Indonesian regimes, unprofitable.   
This shows that such parameters as government and contractor take are not sufficient 
for drawing any conclusions as it fails to provide information about the timing of the 
payment. Thus, the ERR and Saving Index should be considered in combination. While the 
ERR measures the front-end load of the taxation system, the Saving Index in a way measures 
the back-end load. Thus, the concessionary regimes presented in Norway and UK, both 
developed countries that are patient for the petroleum economic rent, charge only income 
based taxes, which automatically decreases the fraction of every dollar saved in costs 
received by contractor, i.e. the SI.  
All in all, the evaluation of the systems supports the results of qualitative analysis 
obtained in Chapter 5.  
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8.5.2 Sensitivity analysis to cost change 
Sensitivity analysis was performed in order to analyse how project profitability 
changes with the change in the input variables, i.e. increase or decrease of capital, operation 
and appraisal and development costs. The spread sheets with the analysis can be found in 
Appendix.  
OPEX -/+50% Change 
By comparing NPV sensitivity analysis to OPEX change of different regimes, the 
following conclusion can be made. NPVs of the oil companies and the governments under 
UK, Norwegian and Indonesian regimes slowly decrease with an OPEX change at the same 
rate. Thus, the NPV of the company is reduced by the same rate as the NPV of the 
government, which means that the risk of an OPEX increase is shared equally. However, 
under Chinese PSA regime the net present value of ‘government take’ is less sensitive to the 
changes than the IOC under the same regime. It means that the risk of OPEX increase is 
more levied on the company.  
 
Figure 0.1 NPV Sensitivity Analysis to OPEX Change 
This can be seen in comparison with other regimes as an incentive to induce 
company’s efforts on cutting costs, as with every operation cost increase/decrease, the 
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company is loosing/gaining higher profit shares. This insight is correlated with high saving 
index of this PSA regime.  
CAPEX -/+50% Change 
Sensitivity analysis to the change of the capital costs is one of the most important ones, 
as the capital costs are a subject of special capital allowance and depreciation terms.  
 
Figure 0.2 NPV Sensitivity Analysis to CAPEX Change 
Similar results are observed for Chinese PSA regime. Most of the risk is levied on the 
company, while the Chinese government secures its share with front-end fiscal tools and, 
thus, is almost neutral to CAPEX change risk. A common characteristic among UK and 
Indonesian regimes is that once the CAPEX increase exceeds 30-35%, more risk is 
transferred to the companies. This is, however, not the case of Norway, which continues to 
have the same risk share ratio.  
 
R&D -/+50% Change 
This sensitivity analysis is mostly interested due to Norwegian fiscal regime, as it 
allows companies to claim 75% of all exploration expenditures.  
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Figure 0.3 NPV Sensitivity Analysis to R&D Change 
Figure 9.3. clearly illustrates this fiscal term, as with exploration and appraisal cost 
increase, the government NPV decreases. Governments under other systems are fairly 
neutral to this risk, even taking into consideration the Total Cost method applied, which 
treats exploration and development costs as capital costs. The main explanation is that this 
group of costs present only 6% of the total project costs.  
8.6 Discussion  
The analysis performed in Part 9.2. presents the following interesting insights 
regarding country’s fiscal regimes.  
The hypothesis made before the analysis was undertaken: ‘Petroleum fiscal systems 
that imply higher marginal tax rates provide more incentives for low cost consciousness 
among the oil companies’, reflects the main findings, as the saving index is calculated based 
on the marginal tax rate on profits. However, additional parameters should always be taken 
into account.  
It is interesting to see that the most neutral system among all, Norwegian R/T, implies 
the lowest incentives to keep the costs low. This makes the neutrality of the Norwegian 
system relatively expensive. This also in fact means, that the Norwegian government by 
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trying to provide as least distortions in the investments as possible, left too little risk for the 
oil companies. In order to find the balance in risk sharing, an option is to introduce front-end 
payments, such as bonuses or royalties.  
Moreover, in a situation of a moral hazard, countries with low Saving Index, such as 
Norway and Indonesia should consider investing in monitoring and increase the observation 
means. This is an alternative for a Norwegian government to consider instead of 
incorporating distortive elements into the design. The investment in monitoring means 
would decrease possibilities for oil companies to perform hidden actions.  
In fact, none of the systems incorporates a ‘gold plating’ risk, i.e. does not create 
incentives to incur real costs that, in the absence of taxation, would be unprofitable. Thus, 
the interests of saving costs of the ‘principal’ and the ‘agent’ are, in fact, aligned. However, 
with an introduction of a moral hazard to the oil and gas industry, the incentives could be 
created through excessive capital allowances, high marginal rates and high government 
participation. Thus, the calculation of the relevant indicators that make an attempt to explain 
how the fiscal regime influences the behavior of the company, i.e. how it provides incentives 
for low or high cost consciousness.  
Another point that is worth discussion is that the figure ‘government take’ failed to 
determine incentives for cost efficiency. In the Chinese system the government take was 
calculated to be over 72%, which is relatively high. At the same time, Chinese PSA SI was 
the highest among all four presented cases – 65%. The reasoning behind ‘government take’ 
and its affect on cost efficiency fails to explain these figures. As the analysis showed, the 
timing of government take is more important, and thus, ERR, as an indicator that measures 
it, should always be included into the evaluation of petroleum fiscal regimes. 
The sensitivity analysis clearly reflected the effect of additional risk the Norwegian 
government incorporates by allowing claiming part of the exploration costs. At the same 
time, Chinese government, which obtains its take from mainly gross revenues, secures itself 
from the risk of CAPEX change.  
A comparative analysis of four regimes provide valuable incentives regarding not only 
the tax terms that influence the most, but also what economic parameters are the best in 
explaining high or low saving index. Besides that, calculation of indices together with NPV 
sensitivity analysis to the costs proved itself as a good combination for this kind of analysis, 
as the sensitivity report provides additional sense of how treatment of different costs, i.e. 
depreciation, allowances, and uplifts, impacts the risk sharing between the oil company and 
the government.  
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9 Conclusion 
The research question of the current master thesis was formulated as follows.  
How does different petroleum fiscal systems affect the cost-related behavior of oil 
companies before and after the contract award?  
In attempt to answer this question, two types of research were conducted. A general 
conclusion is presented in this chapter, while expanded conclusions could be found after the 
relevant research.  
Thus, a model that explains economic incentives of providing deliberate cost 
underestimates under certain assumptions was created to illustrate that the higher the 
expected value of the project is, the most economic incentives there are created. Taking into 
consideration the fiscal system terms, the main parameter that should be looked at is the net 
present value of the oil company.  
The second research provided several important insights related to the ways the 
petroleum fiscal design create incentives for less or more cost conscious behavior of the 
contractor. However, the main conclusion can be drawn – petroleum fiscal design that 
incorporates high marginal rates on the profits rather than revenues, i.e. more back-end 
loaded, in combination with additional capital allowances and uplifts, tends to create higher 
incentives for operators to inflate their costs. However, such a design is also referred to as 
neutral and provides additional incentives for investments. Therefore, the optimal balance in 
risk sharing between the company and the host government in petroleum fiscal designs is 
crucial.    
Additional insights for the fiscal evaluation are also provided. The saving index 
dependable on the marginal rate, levied on the taxable income in the case of R/T or profit oil 
share in the case of PSA, and the contractor’s equity share is the major parameter that should 
be considered while evaluating regimes on the subjects of cost-related incentives.  
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Appendix 1. Megaprojects attributes 
There are over 25 common attributes of megaprojects summarized and presented by 
Virginia A. Greiman (2013), which, among others, include:  
- Long duration: minimum duration is 3-15 years, whereas it can reach 20-40 years for 
oil and gas concessions;  
- Scale and dimension: typical megaproject size exceeds US$1. However, most 
definitions of the scale of a megaproject are imprecise and depend on the specific project 
type. Moreover, the cost of a project needs to be contrasted with the location or country. 
Greiman (2013) also specifies: “oil and gas projects are almost always characterized as 
megaprojects regardless of the size”; 
- Type of industry and purpose: besides oil and gas projects, other typical types are: 
infrastructure projects (bridges, roads, tunnels and etc.), production industries (agriculture, 
rubber plantations), research and development (biotechnology, aerospace innovation), 
consumption (film festivals, Olympic games);  
- Design and construction complexity: there is an extensive number of design phases 
that are to be completed, such as conceptual, environmental feasibility and sustainability, 
geotechnical, structural, tendering, operational and maintenance. Construction complexity is 
defined by technical integration and organizational complexity; 
- Long, complex and critical front end: front end, or an exploratory/formulation phase 
 of a project takes seven years on average. Complexity and importance of the front end 
are explained by high level of ambiguity, design complexity, a significant number of 
variables, multiple stakeholders and an extended impact assessment required in order to get 
the approval. Front end loading is considered to be one of the crucial success factors (See 
Chapter 2.3.1).  
- Consistent cost underestimation and poor performance: the characteristics mentioned 
above explain the challenge to make a precise cost estimation before the operation starts and 
cope with the stretching of available resources to the limit. The scholars and practitioners 
made multiple attempts to identify the reasons behind significant cost overruns (see Chapter 
3), however, cost overruns tend to be “a distinguishing characteristic of megaprojects” 
(Greiman, 2013).  
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Appendix 2.  Net Revenue calculation under R/T and PSA 
tax regimes 
Net Revenue under concessionary regime: 
(Glomsrød & Lindholt, 2004). 
 𝜋! = 𝑝!𝑞! − 𝐶!"# − 𝐶(𝑄! ,𝑅!!!)− 𝑤!𝑥! − 𝐵 − {𝜏!"𝑝!𝑞!+ 𝜏!" 𝑝!𝑞! − 𝛽!"#𝐶!"#$ − 𝛽!"#𝐶(𝑄! ,𝑅!!!)− 𝑢𝑝𝑤!𝑥! } 
Where: 𝐶!"# - is the development or capital costs (CAPEX); 𝐶(𝑄! ,𝑅!!!) – is the extraction costs (OPEX), which vary positively with the rate of 
extraction 𝑄! and negatively with the level of remaining reserves 𝑅; 𝑥! – is the rate of exploratory effort at unit cost 𝑤! in period t; 𝐵 - is the bonus bid in auction licensing or a signature bonus in discretionary licensing; 𝜏!" - is the royalty in period t; 𝜏!"- is the net income tax, including corporate tax, special petroleum tax, petroleum 
revenue tax, resource rent tax and etc.  𝛽!"# and  𝛽!"#- are the correction factors or a share by which capital costs 𝐶!"# and 
operation costs 𝐶(𝑄! ,𝑅!!!) respectively can be deducted; 𝑢𝑝 - is an uplift on exploration costs 𝑤!𝑥!.  
 
Net Revenue under Production Sharing Agreement (PSA): 
(Glomsrød & Lindholt, 2004) 
 𝜋! = 𝛽!"#𝑝!𝑞! − 𝐶!"#$ − 𝐶 𝑞! ,𝑅!!! − 𝑤!𝑥! − 𝐵 + 𝛽!"# 𝑝!𝑞! − 𝛽!"#𝑝!𝑞!− 𝜏!"{𝛽!"# 𝑝!𝑞! − 𝛽!"𝑝!𝑞! + 𝛽!"#𝑝!𝑞! − 𝛽!"#$𝐶!"#$− 𝛽!"#𝐶 𝑞! ,𝑅!!! − 𝑢𝑝𝑤!𝑥!} 
Where: 𝛽!"# – is the share of the production that goes to the contractor to cover costs, so 𝛽!"#𝑝!𝑞! is often referred to as “cost oil”.  𝛽!"# - is the share of production value left after the cost oil is recovered, so 𝛽!"# 𝑝!𝑞! −𝛽!"#𝑝!𝑞!  is contractor’s part of “profit oil”.  
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Appendix 3. Life cycle phases of an oil field and  
Understanding the basics of the physical nature of oil operations is vital for the analysis of 
the economics of petroleum projects. Therefore, a short description of six life cycle phases of 
a typical oil field is presented below. (Nakhle, 2008) 
1) The acquisition of a license or concession 
Before the exploration stage starts, an oil company has to obtain a legal access to 
perform exploration and development activities in a part of a potentially oil rich 
territory.  
2) Exploration 
Throughout this phase seismic surveys are undertaken to identify the prospect. The 
decision whether to proceed further is taken based on the obtained technical data. If 
the conditions are favourable, an exploration well is drilled. If the well proves dry the 
costs of exploration are written-off, while in either case, i.e. the oil is found, the 
company proceeds to the testing phase. The given phase can cost over tens of million 
dollars and involves high risk. While the modern seismic technologies help to 
identify potential traps, only one in ten exploration wells find oil, and only one in 
four of those finds proves commercial (Nakhle, 2008) 
3) Appraisal 
Appraisal of the reservoir follows the successful exploration. Development wells are 
drilled to define the main characteristics of the reservoir, such as size, structure and 
quality. The elements of risk are also presented in this phase even if the exploration 
phase was classified as successful: the quantity of oil or gas may not be enough to 
make the field commercially viable; or filed development may require technologies 
that are too expensive.  
4) Development 
If the appraisal phase proved the field to be commercially attractive, a decision 
regarding the field development is taken. It is a common practice among host 
governments to require a submission of a detailed development plan for their 
approval. 
5) Production 
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The production phase starts with drilling the first production wells. The operating 
revenues and operating costs occur. All costs incurred prior this stage are generally 
considered as capital expenditures.  
6) Abandonment phase 
When the field reaches the point where production levels fall to a level, which ceases 
to cover operating costs, it is decommissioned. Abandonment costs occur and 
generally include plugging of wells, removal of equipment, production tanks and 
installations. These costs of decommissioning can represent the second most 
significant financial event in the business cycle, after installation of facilities 
themselves.  
However, an oil project is not only about the technology and engineering. Laws, 
regulations, leases, auctions and permits is an essential part of the initial phases of the 
project and is the starting point of the value chain of an upstream project.  
Other important unique characteristics of petroleum projects: long time profile, high 
risk and uncertainty in exploration activities, capital intensity (high operating and developing 
costs), volatility of oil prices and maturity of certain oil provinces.  
The physical nature of petroleum operations explains the long time profile of oil and 
gas projects. It may take ten or more years from the initial discovery to first production, 
while the production itself may last over thirty years before the recoverable reserves are 
depleted (Nakhle, 2008). Moreover, most of investment and costs are incurred upfront and 
there may be significant delays of obtaining a return on investments. Besides that, oil and 
gas industry is capital intensive. It requires substantial amounts to be spent annually on 
exploration to discover reservoirs that are large enough to be commercially attractive. 
Natural reservoir depletion implies that an oil company has a limited number of years to 
realise a competitive rate of return.  
As it was mentioned in the description of phases, each step in petroleum projects 
presents a set of risks, which gives oil industry a high-risk profile relatively to other sectors. 
Nakhle (2008) names various risks including political, exploratory (chance of failure), 
technical (reserves and cost estimation), economic (oil and gas prices), or commercial (fiscal 
risks). In comparison with other industry, oil industry provides substantially less certainty 
regarding return on investment, as large investments are necessary before it is known what 
returns to be expected.  
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The oil and gas industry implies a wide range of decisions with different complexities, 
where some can determine the direction and course of billions of dollars each year.  
Summing up all the challenges mentioned above – a long time horizon, capital intensity, a 
wide set of uncertainties and a high risk profile – adding multiple alternatives and complex 
value issues, it becomes clear the challenge of making decisions.  
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Appendix 6. Decision-tree model under PSA regime  
 
 
Appendix 7. Expected government take under the 
concessionary regime  
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2.1
0.5
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0.5
Not	  awarded
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0.35
Not	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0.3
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0.4
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0.3
40$/bbl
0.3
120$/bbl
0.4
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0.3
40$/bbl
$1	  287
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-­‐$512
$5	  913
$2	  256
-­‐$1	  600
$	  243
$	  243
$0
$0
$	  158
$	  121
Opex, mm $ 75% 80% 85% 90% 95% 100% 
% 300 320 340 360 380 400 
EV Gov. PSA  $2,315.22   $2,298.38   $2,281.72   $2,265.05   $2,248.38   $2,231.72  
% 96.4% 97.1% 97.8% 98.5% 99.3% 100.0% 
Appendix 8. NCFs under simplified concessionary regime 
Year Prod Rev R&D 
costs 
CAPEX OPEX Royalty Pre-Tax 
CF 
Depr.  Uplift Taxable 
Income 
CIT NCFs Govern
ment 
take 
2015 0 0 150 0 0 0 -150 0 0 -150 0 -150 0 
2016 0 0 75 0 0 0 -75 0 0 -75 0 -75 0 
2017 0 0 150 0 0 0 -150 0 0 -150 0 -150 0 
2018 0 0 75 0 0 0 -75 0 0 -75 0 -75 0 
2019 0 0 0 200 0 0 -200 0 0 -200 0 -200 0 
2020 0 0 0 1500 0 0 -1500 0 0 -1500 0 -1500 0 
2021 0 0 0 2000 0 0 -2000 0 0 -2000 0 -2000 0 
2022 0 0 0 3000 0 0 -3000 0 0 -3000 0 -3000 192 
2023 20 1600 0 0 400 192 1008 1116.67 45 -153.67 0 1008 760.3 
2024 40 3200 0 0 400 384 2416 1116.67 45 1254.33 376.3 2039.7 760.3 
2025 40 3200 0 0 400 384 2416 1116.67 45 1254.33 376.3 2039.7 760.3 
2026 40 3200 0 0 400 384 2416 1116.67 45 1254.33 376.3 2039.7 760.3 
2027 40 3200 0 0 400 384 2416 1116.67 45 1254.33 376.3 2039.7 760.3 
2028 40 3200 0 0 400 384 2416 1116.67 45 1254.33 376.3 2039.7 1016.4 
2029 37 2960 0 0 400 355.2 2204.8 0 0 2204.8 661.44 1543.36 893.76 
2030 33 2640 0 0 400 316.8 1923.2 0 0 1923.2 576.96 1346.24 709.44 
2031 27 2160 0 0 400 259.2 1500.8 0 0 1500.8 450.24 1050.56 555.84 
2032 22 1760 0 0 400 211.2 1148.8 0 0 1148.8 344.64 804.16 432.96 
2033 18 1440 0 0 400 172.8 867.2 0 0 867.2 260.16 607.04 340.8 
2034 15 1200 0 0 400 144 656 0 0 656 196.8 459.2 248.64 
2035 12 960 0 0 400 115.2 444.8 0 0 444.8 133.44 311.36 156.48 
2036 9 720 0 0 400 86.4 233.6 0 0 233.6 70.08 163.52 95.04 
2037 7 560 0 0 400 67.2 92.8 0 0 92.8 27.84 64.96 8443.1 
Total 400 32000 450 6700 6000 3840 15010 6700 270 8040 4603.1 10406.9 16886.2 
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Appendix 9. NCFs under simplified PSA regime  
 
 
  
Year Production Gross 
Revenue 
R&D costs CAPEX Total 
CAPEX 
OPEX Total costs DD&A Pre-Tax CF 
2015 0 0 150 0 150 0 150 0 -150 
2016 0 0 75 0 75 0 75 0 -75 
2017 0 0 150 0 150 0 150 0 -150 
2018 0 0 75 0 75 0 75 0 -75 
2019 0 0 0 200 200 0 200 0 -200 
2020 0 0 0 1500 1500 0 1500 0 -1500 
2021 0 0 0 2000 2000 0 2000 0 -2000 
2022 0 0 0 3000 3000 0 3000 0 -3000 
2023 20 1600 0 0 0 400 400 1430 1200 
2024 40 3200 0 0 0 400 400 1430 2800 
2025 40 3200 0 0 0 400 400 1430 2800 
2026 40 3200 0 0 0 400 400 1430 2800 
2027 40 3200 0 0 0 400 400 1430 2800 
2028 40 3200 0 0 0 400 400 0 2800 
2029 37 2960 0 0 0 400 400 0 2560 
2030 33 2640 0 0 0 400 400 0 2240 
2031 27 2160 0 0 0 400 400 0 1760 
2032 22 1760 0 0 0 400 400 0 1360 
2033 18 1440 0 0 0 400 400 0 1040 
2034 15 1200 0 0 0 400 400 0 800 
2035 12 960 0 0 0 400 400 0 560 
2036 9 720 0 0 0 400 400 0 320 
2037 7 560 0 0 0 400 400 0 160 
Total 400 32000 450 6700 7150 6000 13150 7150 18850 
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(Continued)  
Year Cost 
amort 
Cost oil 
available 
Cost oil Profit 
oil 
IOC profit 
oil 
Gov profit 
oil 
Tax After-tax 
income 
FCFs Gov take 
2015 0 0  0 0 0 0 0 -150 0 
2016 0 0  0 0 0 0 0 -75 0 
2017 0 0  0 0 0 0 0 -150 0 
2018 0 0  0 0 0 0 0 -75 0 
2019 0 0  0 0 0 0 0 -200 0 
2020 0 0  0 0 0 0 0 -1500 0 
2021 0 0  0 0 0 0 0 -2000 0 
2022 0 0  0 0 0 0 0 -3000 0 
2023 1830 640 640 960 384 576 115.2 268.8 1698.8 691.2 
2024 3020 1280 1280 1920 768 1152 230.4 537.6 1967.6 1382.4 
2025 3570 1280 1280 1920 768 1152 230.4 537.6 1967.6 1382.4 
2026 4120 1280 1280 1920 768 1152 230.4 537.6 1967.6 1382.4 
2027 4670 1280 1280 1920 768 1152 230.4 537.6 1967.6 1382.4 
2028 3790 1280 1280 1920 768 1152 230.4 537.6 537.6 1382.4 
2029 2910 1184 1184 1776 710.4 1065.6 213.12 497.28 497.28 1278.72 
2030 2126 1056 1056 1584 633.6 950.4 190.08 443.52 443.52 1140.48 
2031 1470 864 864 1296 518.4 777.6 155.52 362.88 362.88 933.12 
2032 1006 704 704 1056 422.4 633.6 126.72 295.68 295.68 760.32 
2033 702 576 576 864 345.6 518.4 103.68 241.92 241.92 622.08 
2034 526 480 480 720 288 432 86.4 201.6 201.6 518.4 
2035 446 384 384 576 230.4 345.6 69.12 161.28 161.28 414.72 
2036 462 288 288 432 172.8 259.2 51.84 120.96 120.96 311.04 
2037 574 224 224 336 134.4 201.6 40.32 94.08 94.08 241.92 
Total 31222 12800 12800 19200 7680 11520 2304 5376 5376 13824 
 
Appendix 10. Petroleum fiscal terms assumptions for 
Norway, UK, Indonesia and China 
 
 
UK  
SCT 32% 
CIT 30% 
 
Indonesia  
CIT 25% 
BPT 20% 
GOV FTP 64% 
IOC FTP 36% 
DMO 
(75%*25%*36%) 
7% 
Depreciation (decline) 25% 
Investment credit 16% 
 
China  
VAT 17% 
Recovery limit 63% 
CIT 33% 
Resource tax 5% 
R&D 150% 
 
 
 
 
 
Norway	   	  
CIT	   27%	  
SPT	   51%	  
Depreciation	  (6	  years)	   0.167	  
Uplift	  (4	  years)	   5.50%	  
Exploration	  refund	   75.00%	  
Appendix 11. NCFs under Norway’s concessionary regime  
Year Production, 
mm bbl 
Revenue, 
mm$ 
R&D costs, 
mm$ 
Capex, 
mm$ 
Total 
Capex, 
mm$ 
Opex, 
mm$ 
Pre-Tax 
CF, mm$ 
Depreciation, 
mm$ 
Taxable 
Income, mm$ 
CIT, 
mm$ 
Expl.  
uplift, 
mm$ 
2015 0 0 150 0 150 0 -150 0 -150 0 0 
2016 0 0 75 0 75 0 -75 0 -75 0 0 
2017 0 0 150 0 150 0 -150 0 -150 0 0 
2018 0 0 75 0 75 0 -75 0 -75 0 0 
2019 0 0 0 200 200 0 -200 0 -200 0 0 
2020 0 0 0 1500 1500 0 -1500 0 -1500 0 0 
2021 0 0 0 2000 2000 0 -2000 0 -2000 0 0 
2022 0 0 0 3000 3000 0 -3000 0 -3000 0 0 
2023 20 1600 0 0 0 400 1200 1191.67 8.33 2.25 393.25 
2024 40 3200 0 0 0 400 2800 1191.67 1608.33 434.25 393.25 
2025 40 3200 0 0 0 400 2800 1191.67 1608.33 434.25 393.25 
2026 40 3200 0 0 0 400 2800 1191.67 1608.33 434.25 393.25 
2027 40 3200 0 0 0 400 2800 1191.67 1608.33 434.25 0 
2028 40 3200 0 0 0 400 2800 1191.67 1608.33 434.25 0 
2029 37 2960 0 0 0 400 2560 0 2560 691.2 0 
2030 33 2640 0 0 0 400 2240 0 2240 604.8 0 
2031 27 2160 0 0 0 400 1760 0 1760 475.2 0 
2032 22 1760 0 0 0 400 1360 0 1360 367.2 0 
2033 18 1440 0 0 0 400 1040 0 1040 280.8 0 
2034 15 1200 0 0 0 400 800 0 800 216 0 
2035 12 960 0 0 0 400 560 0 560 151.2 0 
2036 9 720 0 0 0 400 320 0 320 86.4 0 
2037 7 560 0 0 0 400 160 0 160 43.2 0 
Total 400 32000 450 6700 7150 6000 18850 7150 11700 5089.5 1573 
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(Continued)  
Year SPT taxable 
income, 
mm$ 
SPT, mm$ Exploration 
Refund, mm$ 
IOC, mm$ Government take, 
mm$ 
2015 -150.00 0.00 112.50 -37.50 -112.50 
2016 -75.00 0.00 56.25 -18.75 -56.25 
2017 -150.00 0.00 112.50 -37.50 -112.50 
2018 -75.00 0.00 56.25 -18.75 -56.25 
2019 -200.00 0.00 0.00 -200.00 0.00 
2020 -1500.00 0.00 0.00 -1500.00 0.00 
2021 -2000.00 0.00 0.00 -2000.00 0.00 
2022 -3000.00 0.00 0.00 -3000.00 0.00 
2023 -384.92 0.00 0.00 1197.75 2.25 
2024 1215.08 619.69 0.00 1746.06 1053.94 
2025 1215.08 619.69 0.00 1746.06 1053.94 
2026 1215.08 619.69 0.00 1746.06 1053.94 
2027 1608.33 820.25 0.00 1545.50 1254.50 
2028 1608.33 820.25 0.00 1545.50 1254.50 
2029 2560.00 1305.60 0.00 563.20 1996.80 
2030 2240.00 1142.40 0.00 492.80 1747.20 
2031 1760.00 897.60 0.00 387.20 1372.80 
2032 1360.00 693.60 0.00 299.20 1060.80 
2033 1040.00 530.40 0.00 228.80 811.20 
2034 800.00 408.00 0.00 176.00 624.00 
2035 560.00 285.60 0.00 123.20 436.80 
2036 320.00 163.20 0.00 70.40 249.60 
2037 160.00 81.60 0.00 35.20 124.80 
Total 10127.00 9007.58 337.50 5090.42 13759.58 
 86 
Appendix 12. NCFs under UK concessionary regime (same pre-tax CFs) 
Year Pre-Tax CF, 
mm$ 
Net 
Profit1, 
mm$ 
Cummulative 
loss, mm$ 
Loss set-off, 
mm$ 
Taxable 
income, 
mm$ 
CIT and SCT NPV 
IOC, 
mm$ 
NPV 
Gov, 
mm$ 
Project Cash 
Flow, mm$ 
2015 -150 -150 0 0 0 0 -150 0 -150 
2016 -75 -75 -225 0 0 0 -75 0 -75 
2017 -150 -150 -375 0 0 0 -150 0 -150 
2018 -75 -75 -450 0 0 0 -75 0 -75 
2019 -200 -200 -650 0 0 0 -200 0 -200 
2020 -1500 -1500 -2150 0 0 0 -1500 0 -1500 
2021 -2000 -2000 -4150 0 0 0 -2000 0 -2000 
2022 -3000 -3000 -7150 0 0 0 -3000 0 -3000 
2023 1200 1200 -5950 1200 0 0 1200 0 1200 
2024 2800 2800 -3150 2800 0 0 2800 0 2800 
2025 2800 2800 -350 2800 0 0 2800 0 2800 
2026 2800 2800 0 350 2450 1519 1281 1519 2800 
2027 2800 2800 0 0 2800 1736 1064 1736 2800 
2028 2800 2800 0 0 2800 1736 1064 1736 2800 
2029 2560 2560 0 0 2560 1587.2 972.8 1587.2 2560 
2030 2240 2240 0 0 2240 1388.8 851.2 1388.8 2240 
2031 1760 1760 0 0 1760 1091.2 668.8 1091.2 1760 
2032 1360 1360 0 0 1360 843.2 516.8 843.2 1360 
2033 1040 1040 0 0 1040 644.8 395.2 644.8 1040 
2034 800 800 0 0 800 496 304 496 800 
2035 560 560 0 0 560 347.2 212.8 347.2 560 
2036 320 320 0 0 320 198.4 121.6 198.4 320 
2037 160 160 0 0 160 99.2 60.8 99.2 160 
Total 18850 18850 -24600 7150 18850 11687 7163 11687 18850 
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Appendix 13. NCFs under Indonesia’s PSA regime 
Year Production Gross 
Revenue, 
mm$ 
Total 
FTP, 
mm$ 
Gov 
FTP, 
mm$ 
IOC FTP, 
mm$ 
Net 
Revenue, 
mm$ 
DMO, 
mm$ 
R&D costs, 
mm$ 
Capex, 
mm$ 
Total 
Capex, 
mm$ 
2015 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 150 0 150 
2016 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 75 0 75 
2017 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 150 0 150 
2018 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 75 0 75 
2019 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 200 200 
2020 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1500 1500 
2021 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2000 2000 
2022 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3000 3000 
2023 20 1600 320 204.8 115.2 1280 0 0 0 0 
2024 40 3200 640 409.6 230.4 2560 0 0 0 0 
2025 40 3200 640 409.6 230.4 2560 0 0 0 0 
2026 40 3200 640 409.6 230.4 2560 0 0 0 0 
2027 40 3200 640 409.6 230.4 2560 0 0 0 0 
2028 40 3200 640 409.6 230.4 2560 216 0 0 0 
2029 37 2960 592 378.88 213.12 2368 199.8 0 0 0 
2030 33 2640 528 337.92 190.08 2112 178.2 0 0 0 
2031 27 2160 432 276.48 155.52 1728 145.8 0 0 0 
2032 22 1760 352 225.28 126.72 1408 118.8 0 0 0 
2033 18 1440 288 184.32 103.68 1152 97.2 0 0 0 
2034 15 1200 240 153.6 86.4 960 81 0 0 0 
2035 12 960 192 122.88 69.12 768 64.8 0 0 0 
2036 9 720 144 92.16 51.84 576 48.6 0 0 0 
2037 7 560 112 71.68 40.32 448 37.8 0 0 0 
Total 400 32000 6400 4096 2304 25600 1188 450 6700 7150 
(Continued)  
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Year DD&A and 
Investment 
Credit 
Investm
ent 
credit 
Pre-
Tax 
CF 
Total cost 
recovery 
Cost 
recovery 
limit 
Cost 
Carry 
forward 
Cost 
Recovery 
Allowed 
Total  
Profit Oil 
Gov. PO IOC PO 
2015 0 0 -150 0 0  0 0 0 0 
2016 0 0 -75 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2017 0 0 -150 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2018 0 0 -75 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2019 0 0 -200 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2020 0 0 -1500 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2021 0 0 -2000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2022 0 0 -3000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2023 1787.50 1675 1200 3862.5 1280 0 1280 0 0 0 
2024 1340.63 0 2800 1740.6 2560 2582.5 2560.0 0 0 0 
2025 1005.47 0 2800 1405.5 2560 1763.1 2560.0 0 0 0 
2026 754.10 0 2800 1154.1 2560 608.6 1762.7 797.30 510.275 287.029 
2027 2262.30 0 2800 2662.3 2560 0.0 2560.0 0 0 0 
2028 0 0 2800 400 2560 102.3 502.3 2057.69 1316.925 740.77 
2029 0 0 2560 400 2368 0.0 400.0 1968 1259.52 708.48 
2030 0 0 2240 400 2112 0.0 400.0 1712 1095.68 616.32 
2031 0 0 1760 400 1728 0.0 400.0 1328 849.92 478.08 
2032 0 0 1360 400 1408 0 400 1008 645.12 362.88 
2033 0 0 1040 400 1152 0 400 752 481.28 270.72 
2034 0 0 800 400 960 0 400 560 358.4 201.6 
2035 0 0 560 400 768 0 400 368 235.52 132.48 
2036 0 0 320 400 576 0 400 176 112.64 63.36 
2037 0 0 160 400 448 0 400 48 30.72 17.28 
Total 7150 1675 18850 14825 25600  14825 10775 6896 3879 
(Continued) 
Year Taxable Income Gov. Contractor's Projects 
89 
Income tax take NCF NCF 
2015 0 0 0 -150 -150 
2016 0 0 0 -75 -75 
2017 0 0 0 -150 -150 
2018 0 0 0 -75 -75 
2019 0 0 0 -200 -200 
2020 0 0 0 -1500 -1500 
2021 0 0 0 -2000 -2000 
2022 0 0 0 -3000 -3000 
2023 1790.2 447.6 652.4 547.7 1200 
2024 230.4 57.6 467.2 2332.8 2800 
2025 230.4 57.6 467.2 2332.8 2800 
2026 517.4 129.4 1049.2 1750.8 2800 
2027 230.4 57.6 467.2 2332.8 2800 
2028 755.2 188.8 2131.3 668.7 2800 
2029 721.8 180.5 2018.7 541.4 2560 
2030 628.2 157.1 1768.9 471.2 2240 
2031 487.8 122.0 1394.2 365.9 1760 
2032 370.8 92.7 1081.9 278.1 1360 
2033 277.2 69.3 832.1 207.9 1040 
2034 207.0 51.8 644.8 155.3 800 
2035 136.8 34.2 457.4 102.6 560 
2036 66.6 16.7 270.1 50.0 320 
2037 19.8 5.0 145.2 14.9 160 
Total 6670.0 1667.5 13847.5 5002.5 18850 
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Appendix 14. NCFs under China’s PSA regime 
Year Production, 
mm bbl 
Prod/day, 
bbl 
Gross 
Rev 
VAT Resource 
Rent Tax 
Net Rev R&D 
costs 
Capex Total 
Capex 
Opex Total costs 
2015 0 0.00 0 0 0 0 150 0 150 0 150 
2016 0 0.00 0 0 0 0 75 0 75 0 75 
2017 0 0.00 0 0 0 0 150 0 150 0 150 
2018 0 0.00 0 0 0 0 75 0 75 0 75 
2019 0 0.00 0 0 0 0 0 200 200 0 200 
2020 0 0.00 0 0 0 0 0 1500 1500 0 1500 
2021 0 0.00 0 0 0 0 0 2000 2000 0 2000 
2022 0 0.00 0 0 0 0 0 3000 3000 0 3000 
2023 20 54794.52 1600 272 80 1248 0 0 0 400 400 
2024 40 109589.04 3200 544 160 2496 0 0 0 400 400 
2025 40 109589.04 3200 544 160 2496 0 0 0 400 400 
2026 40 109589.04 3200 544 160 2496 0 0 0 400 400 
2027 40 109589.04 3200 544 160 2496 0 0 0 400 400 
2028 40 109589.04 3200 544 160 2496 0 0 0 400 400 
2029 37 101369.86 2960 503.2 148 2308.8 0 0 0 400 400 
2030 33 90410.96 2640 448.8 132 2059.2 0 0 0 400 400 
2031 27 73972.60 2160 367.2 108 1684.8 0 0 0 400 400 
2032 22 60273.97 1760 299.2 88 1372.8 0 0 0 400 400 
2033 18 49315.07 1440 244.8 72 1123.2 0 0 0 400 400 
2034 15 41095.89 1200 204 60 936 0 0 0 400 400 
2035 12 32876.71 960 163.2 48 748.8 0 0 0 400 400 
2036 9 24657.53 720 122.4 36 561.6 0 0 0 400 400 
2037 7 19178.08 560 95.2 28 436.8 0 0 0 400 400 
Total 400 1095890.41 32000 5440 1600 24960 450 6700 7150 6000 13150 
 
91 
(Continued) 
Year DD&A Pre-Tax CF Total cost 
recovery 
Cost 
recovery 
limit 
Cost 
Carry 
forward 
Cost 
Recovery 
Allowed 
Total  
Profit 
Oil 
Government 
share of 
profit oil  
Gov. PO IOC PO 
2015 225 -150 150 0  0 0 0 0 0 
2016 112.5 -75 75 0 150 0 0 0 0 0 
2017 225 -150 150 0 225 0 0 0 0 0 
2018 112.5 -75 75 0 375 0 0 0 0 0 
2019 200 -200 200 0 450 0 0 0 0 0 
2020 1500 -1500 1500 0 650 0 0 0 0 0 
2021 2000 -2000 2000 0 2150 0 0 0 0 0 
2022 3000 -3000 3000 0 4150 0 0 0 0 0 
2023 0 1200 400 1000 7150 1000 248 1 2.48 245.52 
2024 0 2800 400 2000 6550 2000 496 4.5 22.32 473.68 
2025 0 2800 400 2000 4950 2000 496 4.5 22.32 473.68 
2026 0 2800 400 2000 3350 2000 496 4.5 22.32 473.68 
2027 0 2800 400 2000 1750 2000 496 4.5 22.3 473.7 
2028 0 2800 400 2000 150 550 1946 4.5 87.6 1858.4 
2029 0 2560 400 1850 0 400 1908.8 4.1625 79.5 1829.3 
2030 0 2240 400 1650 0 400 1659.2 2.31 38.3 1620.9 
2031 0 1760 400 1350 0 400 1284.8 1.89 24.3 1260.5 
2032 0 1360 400 1100 0 400 972.8 1.54 15.0 957.8 
2033 0 1040 400 900 0 400 723.2 0.9 6.5 716.7 
2034 0 800 400 750 0 400 536 0.75 4.0 532.0 
2035 0 560 400 600 0 400 348.8 0.45 1.6 347.2 
2036 0 320 400 450 0 400 161.6 0.3375 0.5 161.1 
2037 0 160 400 350 0 350 86.8 0.14 0.1 86.7 
Total 7375 18850 13150 20000 32050 13100 11860 35.98 349.1 11510.9 
(Continued) 
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Year Taxable 
Income 
Income tax Gov. take Contractor's 
NCF 
Projects 
NCF 
2015 -225.00 0.00 0.00 -150.00 -150 
2016 -112.50 0.00 0.00 -75.00 -75 
2017 -225.00 0.00 0.00 -150.00 -150 
2018 -112.50 0.00 0.00 -75.00 -75 
2019 -200.00 0.00 0.00 -200.00 -200 
2020 -1500.00 0.00 0.00 -1500.00 -1500 
2021 -2000.00 0.00 0.00 -2000.00 -2000 
2022 -3000.00 0.00 0.00 -3000.00 -3000 
2023 845.52 279.02 633.50 566.50 1200 
2024 2073.68 684.31 1410.63 1389.37 2800 
2025 2073.68 684.31 1410.63 1389.37 2800 
2026 2073.68 684.31 1410.63 1389.37 2800 
2027 2073.68 684.31 1410.63 1389.37 2800 
2028 2008.43 662.78 1454.35 1345.65 2800 
2029 1829.35 603.68 1334.34 1225.66 2560 
2030 1620.87 534.89 1154.02 1085.98 2240 
2031 1260.52 415.97 915.45 844.55 1760 
2032 957.82 316.08 718.26 641.74 1360 
2033 716.69 236.51 559.82 480.18 1040 
2034 531.98 175.55 443.57 356.43 800 
2035 347.23 114.59 327.36 232.64 560 
2036 161.05 53.15 212.09 107.91 320 
2037 36.68 12.10 135.43 24.57 160 
Total 11235.86 6141.58 13530.72 5319.28 18850 
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Appendix 15. Sensitivity analysis of NPV to OPEX change 
OPEX Norway 
IOC 
Norway 
Gov 
 UK 
IOC 
 UK GOV Indonesia 
IOC 
Indonesia Gov China IOC China Gov 
200 $381.50 $3,694.49 $901.11 $3,174.88 $256.60 $3,819.40 $156.45 $3,919.54 
220 $361.56 $3,643.46 $872.80 $3,132.23 $234.45 $3,770.57 $110.28 $3,894.75 
240 $341.63 $3,592.44 $844.49 $3,089.58 $212.31 $3,721.75 $64.10 $3,869.96 
260 $321.69 $3,541.41 $816.17 $3,046.92 $190.17 $3,672.93 $17.93 $3,845.17 
280 $301.75 $3,490.38 $787.86 $3,004.27 $168.03 $3,624.10 $28.25 $3,820.38 
300 $281.81 $3,439.35 $758.55 $2,962.61 $145.84 $3,575.32 $74.43 $3,795.59 
320 $261.87 $3,388.33 $729.06 $2,921.14 $123.31 $3,526.89 $120.60 $3,770.80 
340 $241.93 $3,337.30 $699.56 $2,879.68 $100.79 $3,478.45 $166.78 $3,746.01 
360 $222.00 $3,286.27 $670.06 $2,838.21 $78.26 $3,430.01 $212.96 $3,721.22 
380 $202.06 $3,235.24 $640.56 $2,796.74 $55.73 $3,381.57 $259.18 $3,696.48 
400 $182.12 $3,184.22 $611.06 $2,755.28 $33.20 $3,333.13 $305.43 $3,671.77 
420 $160.85 $3,134.52 $581.56 $2,713.81 $10.68 $3,284.69 $351.69 $3,647.06 
440 $138.62 $3,085.79 $552.06 $2,672.35 $11.85 $3,236.25 $398.07 $3,622.47 
460 $116.39 $3,037.05 $522.56 $2,630.88 $35.36 $3,188.79 $445.07 $3,598.51 
480 $94.16 $2,988.31 $493.06 $2,589.41 $59.51 $3,141.99 $492.07 $3,574.54 
500 $71.93 $2,939.57 $463.56 $2,547.95 $83.67 $3,095.18 $539.07 $3,550.58 
520 $49.70 $2,890.84 $434.06 $2,506.48 $107.83 $3,048.37 $586.07 $3,526.61 
540 $27.47 $2,842.10 $404.56 $2,465.01 $131.99 $3,001.56 $633.07 $3,502.65 
560 $5.25 $2,793.36 $375.06 $2,423.55 $156.14 $2,954.75 $680.07 $3,478.68 
580 $18.72 $2,746.37 $344.18 $2,383.47 $180.66 $2,908.30 $727.83 $3,455.48 
600 $42.69 $2,699.37 $313.29 $2,343.39 $206.72 $2,863.40 $775.65 $3,432.32 
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Appendix 16 Sensitivity analysis of NPV to CAPEX change 
CAPEX Norway IOC Norway Gov UK IOC UK Gov Indonesia 
IOC 
Indonesia Gov China IOC China Gov 
50% $939.95 $4,124.75 $1,584.02 $3,480.69 $802.91 $4,193.97 $1,362.40 $3,702.30 
55% $872.49 $4,022.37 $1,491.32 $3,403.54 $717.39 $4,107.69 $1,195.78 $3,699.09 
60% $805.04 $3,919.99 $1,394.28 $3,330.74 $631.86 $4,021.41 $1,029.16 $3,695.87 
65% $737.58 $3,817.61 $1,297.24 $3,257.95 $546.34 $3,935.13 $862.54 $3,692.65 
70% $670.12 $3,715.23 $1,200.21 $3,185.15 $460.82 $3,848.85 $695.92 $3,689.43 
75% $599.72 $3,615.80 $1,103.17 $3,112.35 $375.29 $3,762.57 $529.24 $3,686.28 
80% $516.20 $3,529.48 $1,006.13 $3,039.55 $289.77 $3,676.29 $362.33 $3,683.35 
85% $432.68 $3,443.17 $909.09 $2,966.76 $204.25 $3,590.01 $195.42 $3,680.43 
90% $349.16 $3,356.85 $812.05 $2,893.96 $118.73 $3,503.73 $28.51 $3,677.50 
95% $265.64 $3,270.53 $714.71 $2,821.46 $33.20 $3,417.44 $138.40 $3,674.57 
100% $182.12 $3,184.22 $611.06 $2,755.28 $6.31 $3,333.13 $305.43 $3,671.77 
105% $93.16 $3,103.34 $507.40 $2,689.10 $52.39 $3,248.89 $472.61 $3,669.11 
110% $3.25 $3,023.41 $403.74 $2,622.92 $137.98 $3,164.64 $639.79 $3,666.45 
115% $86.66 $2,943.49 $300.09 $2,556.74 $229.27 $3,086.09 $806.96 $3,663.79 
120% $176.58 $2,863.56 $196.43 $2,490.56 $327.49 $3,014.47 $974.14 $3,661.13 
125% $266.49 $2,783.64 $92.77 $2,424.38 $425.71 $2,942.86 $1,141.60 $3,658.75 
130% $356.40 $2,703.72 $10.89 $2,358.20 $523.93 $2,871.24 $1,309.20 $3,656.52 
135% $446.31 $2,623.79 $114.54 $2,292.02 $636.80 $2,814.28 $1,476.80 $3,654.28 
140% $536.23 $2,543.87 $263.64 $2,271.28 $815.52 $2,823.16 $1,644.40 $3,652.04 
145% $626.14 $2,463.94 $433.47 $2,271.28 $994.23 $2,832.04 $1,812.38 $3,650.19 
150% $716.05 $2,384.02 $603.31 $2,271.28 $1,172.95 $2,840.92 $1,981.09 $3,649.06 
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Appendix 17 Sensitivity analysis of NPV to R&D change  
R&D Norway IOC Norway Gov UK IOC UK Gov Indonesia 
IOC 
Indonesia Gov China IOC China Gov 
50% $169.43 $3,378.04 $747.74 $2,799.73 $164.88 $3,382.59 $126.14 $3,673.61 
55% $170.70 $3,358.66 $734.07 $2,795.28 $151.71 $3,377.65 $144.06 $3,673.42 
60% $171.97 $3,339.28 $720.41 $2,790.84 $138.54 $3,372.70 $161.98 $3,673.22 
65% $173.24 $3,319.89 $706.74 $2,786.39 $125.38 $3,367.75 $179.90 $3,673.02 
70% $174.51 $3,300.51 $693.07 $2,781.95 $112.21 $3,362.81 $197.82 $3,672.84 
75% $175.77 $3,281.13 $679.40 $2,777.50 $99.04 $3,357.86 $215.76 $3,672.66 
80% $177.04 $3,261.75 $665.73 $2,773.06 $85.87 $3,352.92 $233.69 $3,672.48 
85% $178.31 $3,242.36 $652.06 $2,768.61 $72.71 $3,347.97 $251.63 $3,672.30 
90% $179.58 $3,222.98 $638.39 $2,764.17 $59.54 $3,343.02 $269.56 $3,672.13 
95% $180.85 $3,203.60 $624.73 $2,759.72 $46.37 $3,338.08 $287.50 $3,671.95 
100% $182.12 $3,184.22 $611.06 $2,755.28 $33.20 $3,333.13 $305.43 $3,671.77 
105% $183.39 $3,164.83 $597.39 $2,750.83 $20.04 $3,328.18 $323.37 $3,671.59 
110% $184.66 $3,145.45 $583.72 $2,746.39 $6.87 $3,323.24 $341.30 $3,671.41 
115% $185.59 $3,126.40 $570.05 $2,741.94 $6.30 $3,318.29 $359.24 $3,671.23 
120% $186.43 $3,107.45 $556.38 $2,737.50 $19.47 $3,313.35 $377.17 $3,671.05 
125% $187.27 $3,088.49 $542.71 $2,733.05 $32.63 $3,308.40 $395.11 $3,670.88 
130% $188.11 $3,069.54 $529.05 $2,728.61 $45.80 $3,303.45 $413.04 $3,670.70 
135% $188.95 $3,050.59 $515.38 $2,724.16 $58.97 $3,298.51 $430.98 $3,670.52 
140% $189.79 $3,031.64 $501.71 $2,719.72 $72.14 $3,293.56 $448.91 $3,670.34 
145% $190.63 $3,012.68 $488.04 $2,715.27 $85.30 $3,288.62 $466.85 $3,670.16 
150% $191.47 $2,993.73 $474.37 $2,710.83 $98.47 $3,283.67 $484.78 $3,669.98 
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